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ABSTRACT 
This is the second in a series of two articles looking into the interaction 
between differential capital accumulation and Middle East 'energy 
conflicts'. Examining the historical record since the late 1960s, we find US 
policies to have been increasingly consistent with the coinciding differen- 
tial interests of a Weapondollar-Petrodollar coalition of large defence 
contractors and oil companies. Contrary to aggregate views which empha- 
size the 'national interest' or the broad imperatives of capital accumulation 
- but in line with the differential interests of these companies - US poli- 
cies in the region seem to have contributed towards greater instability, 
imposed limits on the free flow of oil and led to higher unstable prices. 
Most significantly, every 'energy conflict' since the late 1960s was preceded 
by adverse drops in the differential rate of profit of the large oil compa- 
nies, which then promptly recovered in the wake of the ensuing crisis. 
While the US government was officially seeking regional conciliation, it 
passively or actively endorsed each one of these conflicts. The current 
peace drive between Israel and its Arab neighbours is overshadowed by 
negative differential profits for the oil companies and depressed weapon 
sales for the arms contractors. Left unresolved, these predicaments could 
eventually culminate in a new 'energy conflict'. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The literature on the postwar Middle East usually treats regional conflicts 
and energy crises as related though essentially distinct phenomena. Wars 
are commonly seen as arising from a combination of local conflicts com- 
plicated by superpower interactions. Energy crises, on the other hand, are 
generally perceived as a consequence of changing global market condi- 
tions and institutional arrangements (such as the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries, OPEC). Some conflicts - for instance, the 
1990-1 war between Iraq and the US-led coalition - have been partly 
attributed to a struggle over the control of crude reserves, whereas others 
- specifically the Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973, and the Iraq-Iran 
conflict of 1980-8 - were seen as having aggravated ongoing energy crises. 
Until now, however, there has been no unified theory of 'energy conflicts' - 
that is, a framework which integrates militarization and conflict with 
global energy flows and changing oil prices. Moreover, existing writings 
on the subject of oil and war in the Middle East tend to deal rather 
inadequately or not at all with the potential role of capital accumu1ation.l 
In an earlier article (Nitzan and Bichler, 1995) we offered a new inter- 
pretation which seeks to analyse a whole string of Middle East wars 
within a coherent framework of 'energy conflicts', emphasizing the 
centrality of accumulation. (The two articles form a coherent whole, 
and although some of the key findings of the first article are surnrnar- 
ized below, they do not offer a substitute for the overall framework 
and the full range of evidence provided there.2) Our methodological 
starting point was the diferential accumulation of capital. We argued that 
in mature capitalism, the ultimate driving force is not the augmentation 
of hedonic pleasure, but the attainment of differential gain. With the 
development of communication and the integration of financial markets, 
there emerges a so-called 'normal rate of return' - a subjective but 
forceful norm which capitalists tend to equate with 'business as usual'. 
The antagonistic essence of business, however, requires businessmen to 
do better than the average, that is to achieve a diferential rate of return. 
Driven by the quest for differential accumulation, capitalists seek to 
expand their own profit faster than the 'normal' rate of return, which 
is in turn equivalent to raising their distributive share in the overall 
flow of profit (provided the differential rate of accumulation exceeds the 
growth in the number of firms). As capitalism develops and expands, 
the dictates of differential accumulation become paramount in both 
business and politics. For the corporate executive, the task is now 
commonly defined in terms of 'beating the average' and 'exceeding the 
normal', whereas for the state manager, national success often appears 
synonymous with large home-based companies outperforming their 
counterparts in other countries. 
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Seen as a habit of thinking, the principle of differential accumulation 
enables us to focus on the convergence of politics and business without 
resorting to conspiracy theory. Captured by the same set of conventions, 
corporate executives and state managers could act to advance differen- 
tial accumulation without having to collude either overtly or covertly. 
Although the practice of conspiracy is often expedient in facilitating 
collective action, elevating it into a theoretical principle tends to endow 
'actors' with far more autonomy than they in fact possess. Our own 
premise is that the progressive concentration of power brought by differ- 
ential accumulation also tends to make the rules of the game much more 
rigid and confining. The 'normal rate of return' today is a force far more 
potent than it ever was: although it enables the amalgamation of power 
on an unprecedented scale, the business and political holders of that 
power are decreasingly free to exercise it as they wish. In late twentieth- 
century capitalism, 'beating the average' is no longer a privilege but an 
obligation. In this sense, modem accumulation has become less of a free 
quest for material well-being and utility and more of a deterministic drive 
towards economic and political power. It is this latter property which makes 
differential accumulation so crucial for the emerging field of inter- 
national political economy, and that is why we placed it at the centre 
of our analysis of armament and oil. 
Starting from this premise, we argued in Nitzan and Bichler (1995) that 
from the early 1970s there arose a Weapondollar-Petrodollar coalition of 
large, mostly US-based armament and oil companies whose interests 
coincided in the Middle East. Our empirical examination focused specifi- 
cally on an Arma-Core which we defined to include sixteen leading US 
defence companies, and on a Petro-Core comprising the world's six 
largest non-government oil c~mpanies.~ These core groups were also 
complemented by engineering and construction giants like Bechtel, as 
well as financial institutions with significant energy dealings. The inter- 
ests of these companies, we maintained, were served not by greater 
regional stability and by free-flowing and moderately priced oil but 
rather, on the contrary, by an atmosphere of continuous instability and 
energy crisis. The effect of recurring Middle East 'energy conflicts' on oil 
prices helped the leading oil companies counteract the incessant forces of 
competition, enabling them to keep their long-term profitability above the 
big economy's average. At the same time, such conflicts also promoted 
an arms race in the region (which from 1974 became the world's largest 
market for imported weapons) and helped to alleviate the pressure on 
the US arms contractors of falling military spending at home. What made 
this convergence of interests particularly enduring was its reinforcing 
dynamics: on the one hand, militarization accentuated regional tensions 
and conflicts which helped to maintain and raise oil prices, while, on the 
other, higher oil prices brought larger petroleum revenues for the region's 
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Figure I Crude oil prices (annual averages) 
Sourcc: Crude oil prices are h m  IMF, IntmutlaMI Fimnriol Sb t i s t in  Yark&, 1986, 
pp. 17W1; 1994, p. 169. CDP price deflator is fmm US Congress, Emnomu Re@ of the 
Presided, 1994, Table 813, 176. 
Note: Cmde oil prices for 1960-84 are given by the price of Saudi Arabian light (Ras 
Tanurd), and for 1 M  by the avmge world spot price. The 'real' price of oil is obtained 
by dividing the nominal figures by the US GDP implicit price deflator. 
governments, which were then partly channelled into the purchase of 
imported arms in preparation for new conflicts. The pattern of oil prices 
- in both nominal and real terms - is charted in Figure 1, where we also 
note their relation to the outbreak of 'energy conflicts'. 
Although this regime of tension and crisis was generally beneficial for 
the Weapondollar-Petrodollar coalit~on, there were nevertheless certain 
differences between the interests of the armament and oil companies 
compris~ng that coalition. For the former, arms exports constituted a net 
addition to sales, so their gain from Middle East militarization and armed 
conflict was pra&cally open ended. For the latter, however, the con- 
sequences of tension and hostilities were beneficial only up to a certaln 
point - first because excessively high prices tend to encourage energy 
substitution, weaken profits in downstream operations and lure entry 
from potential competitors and, second, since regional instability could 
spin out of control and undermine the close cooperation between the 
companies and the oil-produdng countries. Given these qualifications, 
we &ued that while &e armament companies would tend to have few 
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reservations about further militarization and conflict, the oil companies 
were likely to be more cautious. Specifically, we hypothesized that as 
long as the large companies of the Petro-Core enjoy a combined rate of 
return in excess of the big economy's 'normal' (approximated by the 
average net rate of return for the Fortune-500 group of companies), 
they judge their performance as satisfactory and prefer the continuation 
of 'tension without war'. However, when their rate of profit falls below the 
big economy's average - that is, when their differential rate of accumulation 
turns negative - the oil firms become more inclined to accept open hostil- 
ities as a means of achieving higher conflict-driven prices and better rates 
of return. 
When this happens, the more aggressive stance of the large oil com- 
panies brings them into a temporary consensus with the leading arma- 
ment firms, and it is at this point, when the Weapondollar-Petrodollar 
coalition becomes united, that a Middle East 'energy conflict' is more 
likely to erupt. The pivotal significance of differential oil profits is illus- 
trated in Figures 2a and 2b.4 The first of these charts contrasts the rate 
of return for the Petro-Core with the comparable rate for the Fortune- 
500, whereas the second plots the difference between the two rates 
(expressed in percentage points). In both diagrams, a dark area denotes 
a 'danger zone' - a period of negative differential accumulation when 
the Petro-Core profitability falls short of the big economy's average. 
The evidence arising from these charts is rather remarkable. First, every 
one of these 'danger zones' was followed by the outbreak of an 'energy 
crisis': the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the 1979 
Islamic Revolution in Iran, the outbreak of the 1980-8 Iraq-Iran War 
and, recently, the 1990-1 Gulf War. Second, the onset of each of these 
crises was followed by a reversal of fortune, with the Petro-Core's rate 
of return rising above the comparable big-economy average. And finally, 
no 'energy conflict' has erupted without the Petro-Core first falling 
into the 'danger zone'. In 1992, Petro-Core profitability dropped 
once again into a 'danger zone' and political tensions intensified. In 
1993 President Clinton launched two massive missile attack on Iraqi 
targets. In mid-1994, war broke out in Yemen between Aden and Sanaa 
and, in October, with the Petro-Core's differential profitability still 
negative, Clinton dispatched US forces once more to the Gulf in order 
to counteract an alleged Iraqi military build-up against Kuwait. As of 
1995, however, the 'danger zone' remains open and - provided our 
historical framework is still valid - could eventually culminate in a new 
'energy ~onflict'.~ 
Since causality is always a speculative concept, one may argue that this 
association between differential accumulation and energy conflicts could 
be merely a coincidental proxy for other, more significant causal rela- 
tionships. For instance, conflict may be the consequence of movements in 
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profitability rather than diferential profitability. This, however, does not 
seem to be the case here. Figures 2a and 2b show that the rate of profit 
of the Petro-Core fell in 1969-70, 1972, 1975,197743,1980-2,1985-7 and 
1991. Energy conflicts, on the other hand, erupted only in 1967 (after 
the Core's profits were rising), in 1973 and 1979-80 (after they were 
falling) and in 1990 (after they were rising). In addition, despite 
falling profitability, no new energy conflict broke out in 1969-70, 1976, 
1983 or 1988. Clearly, there is no straightforward connection between 
movements in the simple rate of profit for the Petro-Core and the occur- 
rence of conflicts. 
Another possible explanation is that conflicts were triggered not by 
setbacks for the Petro-Core but rather by the simultaneous decline in 
real oil revenues for OPEC: such declines would have made their regimes 
more unstable and increase their readiness for conflict. The facts, 
however, do not seem to support this explanation either. For instance, 
UN Statistical Yearbook data suggest that Egyptian oil exports rose from 
$35 million in 1970, to $47 million in 1972 and to $93 million in 1973. If 
wars were indeed contingent on falling state revenues, this should have 
worked against the Arab-Israeli conflict in 1973. Similarly, the Iraq-Iran 
War erupted in 1980, after oil revenues for the two countries were 
climbing rapidly, reaching $18.4 billion for Iran and an all-time high 
of $26.9 billion for Iraq, and ended in 1988 after they fell sharply to 
$12.7 billion for Iran and to $15.9 billion for Iraq (US Department of 
Energy, 1995: 23, 93). Finally, the 1990 Iraqi invasion into Kuwait 
occurred after several years of stable oil production: the value of Iraqi 
annual crude oil output remained more or less stationary between 1987 
and 1990 at around $14.7 billion (ibid.). Of course, prior to his invasion 
of Kuwait, Saddam Hussein was under growing financial strain accu- 
mulated during his years of fighting against Iran, so he needed much 
more than stable oil earnings to resolve his problems. Nevertheless, 
as we shall argue below, this rationale was hardly sufficient to outweigh 
a clear threat of forceful US intervention, had there been one. In short, 
regional factors are crucial but their role is better understood as part 
of a broader political-economic context which emphasizes the processes 
of differential accumulation and the dynamics of the Weapondollar- 
Petrodollar coalition. 
Taken at face value, our findings suggest that the corporate members 
of this coalition were not 'free ridersf on the roller-coaster of Middle 
East conflicts. Indeed, the evidence indicates not only that these com- 
panies have eventually gained from militarization and oil crises, but more 
fundamentally, that adverse drops in their differential profits have been 
a most effective leading indicator for upcoming 'energy conflictsf. It is 
hard to dismiss such evidence as a mere statistical mirage. By the stan- 
dards of empirical social science research, the link between differential 
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accumulation on the one hand, and militarization, 'energy conflictsf and 
oil crises on the other, is far too systematic and encompassing to be 
ignored, and calls for further analysis. 
Underlying the statistical picture depicted in the charts lies the conver- 
gence of two long-term developments: the growing commercialization of 
the weapon trade and the increasing politicization of the oil business 
(Nitzan and Bichler, 1995). With unstable procurement at home, the 
Arma-Core has grown dependent on the commercial arena of foreign 
weapon sales, while for the Petro-Core, international competition and 
technological developments have spelt excess capacity which could have 
been counteracted only through a broader political realignment with 
their host and parent governments. This progressive amalgamation of 
the economic with the political means that the role of differential accu- 
mulation cannot be understood in isolation from the state. The purpose 
of this article is to look more closely at this issue, focusing specifically 
on US foreign policy in the Middle East. If differential accumulation by 
the Weapondollar-Petrodollar coalition was indeed a principal 'regu- 
lating' force in the recent history of Middle East militarization and 
conflicts, it must have affected US foreign policy. That this was indeed 
the case is crucial for our thesis: in Nitzan and Bichler (1995) we outlined 
the 'mechanismf leading from accumulation to the arms trade, to the 
politics of oil, to 'energy conflictsf; the picture now needs to be completed 
by accounting for the role of US policy. 
The main issue is not to uncover conspiracies (although that should 
not be ignored either), but rather to demonstrate convergence or diver- 
gence of interests. Specifically, by examining the historical record since 
the late 1960s, we seek to answer two interrelated questions: (1) has US 
foreign policy in the Middle East worked to accommodate and advance 
the differential accumulation interests of the Weapondollar-Petrodollar 
coalition? (2) was this policy also consistent with the interests of other 
US 'societal groupsf, and if not, could it be seen as transcending the 
interests of particular groups, seeking instead to defend some broader 
'national interestf? 
2 THE STATE A N D  ACCUMULATION: 
A BRIEF DIGRESSION 
The nature of these questions is to some extent affected by current theor- 
etical controversies about the role of the state in international political 
economy. A crucial stumbling block in resolving these controversies is 
the absence - by fault or design - of a clear empirical focus on accumu- 
lation. The 'functionalistf branch of marxism, led by writers such as 
OfConnor (1973) and Cohen (1978), offers a framework which in our view 
is too encompassing. Their notion that the capitalist state is captured by 
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the 'structure of accumulation' may be correct, but the manner in which 
this idea has often been presented is dangerously close to a tautology. 
The difficulty arises when institutions such as the welfare state, price con- 
trols and public investment, which seem counter to the 'raw' capitalist 
interests, are nevertheless interpreted as 'necessary' or 'required' in order 
to maintain the long-term viability of the system as a whole. 
Unfortunately, the search for 'historical laws of motion' always carries 
the danger of turning useful hypotheses into rigid dogmas. By viewing 
capitalist development much like a natural process, the functionalists 
have effectively turned Hegel's 'cunning of reason' into the 'cunning of 
the capitalist system' - and in the process made their approach increas- 
ingly difficult to refute. The problem is further aggravated if we follow 
Wallerstein (1974), who sees states as 'agents' of a broader capitalist 
'world system'. The system is said to develop and restructure itself in a 
way which best accommodates its fundamental interest of global accu- 
mulation, but then the nature of accumulation - that is, what is being 
accumulated and, most importantly, towards what end - remains vague. In 
contrast to their functionalist counterparts, 'instrumentalist' marxists, 
such as Dornhoff (1983) or Engler (1977), have opted for a lower level of 
abstraction, accentuating the primacy of big business. However, their 
common preoccupation with institutional structures often comes at the 
expense of a clear insight into the financial essence of accumulation. And 
so, although the instrumentalists' premise is perhaps more manageable, 
their empirical analyses still leave out an indispensable component. 
According to Krasner (1994: 17), the alleged failure of marxism has 
left only 'two real candidates for understanding the contemporary inter- 
national environment - power politics, including realism and its variants, 
and liberalism'. Their advantages in his opinion are manifold: 'Both are 
actor-oriented perspectives. Both have made plausible empirical claims. 
Both have heuristic power. And both can draw on many of the powerful 
analytic techniques that have been developed in recent years by 
economics.' Yet, this confidence is hardly warranted since realism and 
liberalism also share a principal deficiency: they both neglect the central 
role of accumulation. The liberal emphasis on the individual 'societal 
actor' creates a framework in which historical developments, including 
the behaviour of the state, are inherently random, subject to the changing 
pressures exerted by the numerous participants. This, of course, is 
perfectly legitimate, but the consequence is a vision in which the process 
of capital accumulation is no longer the main driving force of capitalist 
development. And, indeed, liberal writings - including those which 
analyse the behaviour of firms - commonly fail to provide a coherent 
political-economic theory of accumulation. 
Unlike the liberals, realist (or statist) writers, such as Krasner (1978a), 
Lipschutz (1989) and Waltz (1979), do emphasize the existence of a 
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central historical tendency - namely, the tendency of the state (particu- 
larly the strong state) to subjugate 'societal actors' to the 'national 
interest'. Krasner (1978a: 12) defines the national interest as 'the utility 
of the community', which he equates with 'the goals that are sought by 
the state'. In his opinion, this definition of the national interest makes 
statist theory superior to its marxist counterpart since it is consistent not 
only with the state failing to serve the interest of capitalism, but also 
with state officials acting to undermine that interest (ibid.: 15-17). In other 
words, instead of the 'capitalistic determinism' of functionalist marxism 
we now have the 'cunning of the national interest'. The upshot is that 
the process of accumulation - to the extent that this is even mentioned 
- becomes merely a means of augmenting state capabilities. In this sense, 
liberalism and statism could offer satisfactory alternatives to marxism 
only if we accept that accumulation no longer constitutes the essence 
of capitalism. 
3 DIFFERENTIAL ACCUMULATION A N D  US 
FOREIGN POLICY I N  THE MIDDLE EAST 
Our findings - both in Nitzan and Bichler (1995) and in this article - 
corroborate our basic hypothesis: they suggest that, over the years, the 
politics of weapons and oil in the Middle East - including the contours 
of US foreign policy - were increasingly affected by the differential 
accumulation of the Weapondollar-Petrodollar coalition. Unfortunately, 
situating these findings within the existing literature is not an easy exer- 
cise. As noted earlier, the separate emphasis on the issues of war and 
energy means that up till now, there has been little systematic attempt 
to develop a comprehensive account of 'energy conflicts', let alone to 
integrate this into a coherent framework of accumulation. The con- 
sequence is numerous explanations for individual wars and an equally 
voluminous literature on oil crises, but no encompassing attempt to tie 
the two as part of a central historical process. Under these circumstances, 
our task is not to explain each individual conflict better than existing 
accounts, but rather to provide a general framework consistent with a 
whole array of conflicts. On this count, the emphasis on differential 
accumulation and the Weapondollar-Petrodollar coalition seems to have 
produced a highly robust result. Our approach is particularly powerful 
in being theoretically coherent and non-eclectic, historically consistent 
over the past three decades, and, most importantly, rooted in the central 
process of differential accumulation. Finally, up to date, this approach 
has yielded a perfect predictive record. 
Situated in the broader conceptual context of state theory, our 
approach and findings appear consistent, to a greater or lesser extent, 
with both marxist and liberal views. They do not sit well, however, with 
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the statist approach. Instrumentalist marxism argues that state policy is 
responsive to the profit requirements of the largest corporations, and if 
the latter could be defined in differential terms, this branch of marxism 
could easily endorse our evidence. The overlap with functionalist 
marxism is more limited. The functionalist emphasis on the fundamental 
primacy of accumulation is in line with our own, though diferential 
accumulation for the Weapondollar-Petrodollar coalition need not be 
consistent with, and may even run against, the long-term interests of 
the 'capitalist system'. For instance, in his recent writings about the 
Middle East, Bromley (1991a, 1991b) identifies secured access to rela- 
tively cheap oil as essential in underwriting US hegemony over global 
capital accumulation - a goal which clearly conflicts with attempts to 
destabilize the region and raise energy prices. (Of course, since the inter- 
ests of the 'capitalist system' or 'US hegemony' are usually not that well 
defined, to the extent that state managers tend to identify the 'system' 
with its largest corporations, the differential growth of these companies 
could be seen as synonymous with the viability of capitalism.) Liberals 
should find it difficult to endorse differential accumulation as the prin- 
cipal force driving state policy, though they could accept our results on 
different grounds. Given its emphasis on the multiple dimensions of 
societal interactions, liberalism by definition rules out the overriding 
determinism of accumulation. For liberal writers, differential accumula- 
tion could be seen as one of many factors affecting the state, but certainly 
not as the ever-present, dominant one. However, the empirical findings 
may stand even without the general principle. Indeed, a liberal could 
interpret our evidence much more loosely, by associating the link 
between differential accumulation and 'energy conflicts' with the 
ephemeral power position of the oil and armament companies. 
In contrast to these overlaps with marxism and liberalism, the statist 
view and the principle of differential accumulation appear contradictory 
on a number of substantive counts. First, although the accumulation of 
capital can be seen as contributing to state capabilities, diferential 
accumulation cannot. From an overall statist perspective, promoting the 
growth of Exxon and General Dynamics at the expense of non-defence 
and non-energy firms such as Philip Morris, Coca Cola or Merck makes 
no sense. Second, the notion that access to Middle East oil is in the 
'national interest' of the United States is far too general. To be worthy 
of its name, the 'national interest' must be related to the broad interests 
of society. As far as the Middle East is concerned, this certainly includes 
secured oil supplies, but also stable and preferably low petroleum prices, 
which are all crucially dependent on regional stability. On these counts, 
however, the evidence in this article suggests that from the early 1970s, 
US foreign policy in the Middle East was increasingly working against 
the national interest. Alternatively, if the 'national interest' is what state 
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officials define it to be, this interest seems (at least in this case) less in 
line with the general good of society and more attuned to the particular 
needs of the weapon and oil producers. Third, some realists, such as 
Krasner (1978a, 1978b), claim that after the end of the Second World 
War, the ideological desire to contain Communism overshadowed the 
lesser material commitments to secured supplies and market competi- 
tion. On the face of it, this thesis seems validated by the current 
US-supported 'peace blitz' in the Middle East, following the collapse of 
the Communist threat. On a closer look, however, the evidence tells a 
somewhat different story. The current peace drive may be concerned 
with stabilizing the eastern Mediterranean, but this in itself is part of a 
broader attempt to build a new pro-westem alliance against Islamic 
fundamentalism. Indeed, since the early 1990s, American arms export 
agreements with Middle East governments have reached all-time highs, 
and their continuous ascent could spell further turmoil down the road. 
(Given its many overlaps with statism, functional marxism too is open 
to similar criticisms. However, since accumulation is largely ignored by 
the former while being the centrepiece of the latter, for our purpose the 
two approaches could not be lumped together even provisionally.) 
The statist view is vulnerable, at least in part, because it emphasizes 
stated (or assumed) goals instead of actual policies. Krasner (1978a: ch. 2), 
for instance, defines the national interest inductively by ranking the 
declared aims of state officials, and then goes on to show that these 
stated aims have on occasion contradicted the interests of the large petro- 
leum companies. The problem is that this confuses presentation with 
intention. There is very little a-priori reason to accept that state officials 
want low oil prices or greater competition just because they say so. 
People in power rarely admit that their actions contradict the common 
good, so the fact that state managers declare their commitment to stable 
oil supplies at cheap prices is not necessarily illuminating of their true 
goals. Furthermore, even if they sincerely believe what they say, that 
in itself tells us little about what they actually do. Hence, a valid 
test for the statist thesis must go beyond declared goals, and look at 
actual policies and their eventual efects. 
These considerations become important as we move from the 'free- 
flow' period of the pre-1970s, to the 'limited-flow' era of the oil crises 
(for more on this terminology, see Nitzan and Bichler, 1995). Up until 
the late 1960s, the interests of the oil companies in free access to oil 
deposits and in stable and moderate prices could be viewed as coin- 
ciding with the broader interests of the US economy (or its capitalist 
class). In the subsequent period since the 1970s, however, the interest of 
these firms was not so much in concessions, but in unstable, high prices. 
Contrary to the portrayal by Krasner (1978a: 39-40) of a negative trade- 
off between the level and variability of petroleum prices, the relationship 
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between them since the late 1960s became positive (see Figure 1 above). 
In other words, from the late 1960s on US policy makers had to 'choose' 
not between low and variable oil prices as opposed to high and stable 
ones, but rather between low and stable prices against high and volatile 
ones. This fundamental change brought to the forefront the inherent 
conflict between the Weapondollar-Petrodollar coalition and the so-called 
'national interest'. If until the late 1960s one could conceivably explain 
US policy tolerance towards higher prices as an attempt to achieve the 
more important goal of stable and secured supplies, since the 1970s this 
no longer held true. From the first 'mini' energy crisis of 1967, higher 
prices could no longer be seen as a necessary cost for achieving secured 
and stable supplies. If anything, higher oil prices were increasingly 
caused by and, in fact, contributed towards greater instability. 
Given this potential clash between the 'national interest' and the differ- 
ential needs of the Weapondollar-Petrodollar coalition, the statist view 
must demonstrate that whenever this clash arose, US policy supported the 
former rather than the latter. In what follows, we look at the background 
of each of the 'energy conflicts' - the Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973, 
the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the Iraq-Iran war of 1980-8 and, 
finally, the 199Ck1 war between Iraq and the US-led coalition. Taken as 
a whole, our findings do not support the statist interpretations (and to 
some extent they also undermine the functionalist marxist view). Instead, 
they show, first, that US foreign policy objectives in the Middle East were 
far less coherent and much more flexible than argued by statist writers; 
and second, that while the actual policies were sometimes consistent with 
both the 'national interest' and the particular interests of the 
Weapondollar-Petrodollar coalition, whenever these interests difered - and 
that was increasingly the case during the new 'limited-flow' era - US policies 
tilted in favour of the coalition, even at the cost of sacrificing the 'national 
interest '. 
4 THE 1967 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR 
Analyses of the June 1967 War are customarily cast in terms of three 
regional processes, none of which is directly related to energy. One 
process is the growing ethnic and cultural antagonism between Arabs 
and Jews which has intensified since the turn of the century, evolving 
after 1948 into a nationalistic clash between Israel, the Palestinians 
and the Arab states (Safran, 1978). A second process concerns the barriers 
on rapidly growing population imposed by an acute shortage of water, 
a problem which many writers tend to see as lying at the root of the 
conflict between Israel and Jordan, Syria and Lebanon (Kelly, 1986; Naff 
and Matson, 1984; Rabinovitch, 1983; and Sexton, 1990). The third 
process, which has received considerable attention in recent years, is the 
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development since the 1950s of nuclear weapons by Israel (Hersh, 1991). 
According to Aronson (1992,1994), the nuclear arms race was the focus 
of internal ideological and political struggles within the Israeli elites and 
the main determinant of Israeli foreign and security policies. 
Yet the conflict was also related, even at that early stage, to the 
growing global significance of the Middle East. The 'free-flow' era after 
the Second World War was marked by US concerns for assuring access 
to the region's oil fields. During the late 1940s and early 1950s) many 
in the State Department saw Israel as a disturbing factor which might 
provoke anti-American sentiments, weaken the US position in Iran, 
Turkey and Greece, and possibly lead to a loss of control over the oil 
routes (Gazit, 1983a). In this sense, official US foreign policy appears to 
have followed a combination of material and ideal goals much like the 
one accentuated by statist writers such as Krasner (1978a, 1978b) and 
Lipschutz (1989)) and indeed, during that period the State Department 
emphasized relations with Arab oil producers while downplaying any 
open support for the Jewish state. 
Until the mid-1950s) the military burden of protecting western inter- 
ests in the oil routes was assumed by Britain, but in 1956 Britain 
and France lost some of their key strongholds in the Middle East, and 
in 1958 the United States made its first military foray into the region. 
From the late 1950s) concerns for the free flow of oil were heightened 
by a combination of rising Arab nationalism and increasing Soviet 
intrusion into the region. Following the 1954 seizure of power in Egypt 
by Nasser, the emergence of Pan-Arabism presented a growing threat 
to the feudal regimes of Saudi Arabia and surrounding sheikhdoms. 
Faisal, the pro-American king of Iraq, was assassinated and succeeded 
by an anti-western military junta, and the Baghdad Pact of 1955 fell 
apart. This, together with the Egyptian-Syrian union, attempts to topple 
King Hussein in Jordan, and Syrian subversive involvement in Lebanon 
contributed towards a reassessment of US policy in the region. 
Under the new 'Eisenhower Doctrine', the United States now assumed 
military responsibility for the Persian Gulf and the Arab Peninsula (Gold, 
1993: 35). In addition, it also started fortifying its positions on the 
external perimeter of the oil region. In 1958, Israel became a 'strategic 
asset', recognized for its stable, pro-western characteristics and conceived 
as a potential logistical base (Safran, 1978: ch. 20).6 Although the US State 
Department, during both Truman's and Eisenhower's presidencies, was 
not particularly interested in such Israeli services, the CIA was and it 
began fostering secret liaisons with Israeli politicians and security offi- 
cials. One of these relations was linked to a proposal by Ben Gurion that 
Israel create a peripheral pro-American alliance with non-Arab countries 
such as Turkey, Iran and Ethiopia, to help contain Arab radicalism. Part of 
this new alliance was a secret agreement - code-named KK Mountain - 
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according to which the Israeli intelligence service Mossad would become 
a permanent paid 'subcontractor' for the CIA, carrying out operations 
which for various reasons were better delegated to non-US elements. 
Assuming its new role, the Mossad quickly became involved in numerous 
proxy undertakings in Africa and the Middle East. Among others, these 
included agitating and financing the 1961 Kurdish revolt to destabilize the 
pro-Nasser regime in Iraq and, in 1962, sending arms and providing train- 
ing to the Royalists fighting against Egyptian and Soviet forces in Yemen 
(Cockburn and Cockburn, 1991: ch. 5). 
These and similar operations were allegedly part of the CIA'S effort 
to have the new Kennedy administration pay more attention to the 
Middle East (ibid.). The role of the CIA is especially noteworthy because 
after the Second World War and particularly from the early 1950s, the 
agency's Middle Eastern operations were almost exclusively handled by 
the ARAMCO partners (Chevron, Texaco, Exxon and Mobil) and Bechtel 
(McCartney, 1989: ch. 10). Despite his favourable attitude towards the 
petroleum industry and the close oil connections of some his top 
officials? Kennedy was not swayed and continued to pursue a policy of 
appeasement towards Nasser. However, his 'New Look' doctrine also 
permitted, for the first time, American military shipments to Israel. 
Contrary to the 'nuclear-containment' policy of his predecessors, 
Kennedy emphasized the use of conventional weapons and direct 
involvement against Soviet subversion. In 1960, he announced that he 
was not opposed to a 'military balance' between Israel and the Arab 
countries, and in so doing he opened the door for a regional arms race 
(Gazit, 1983b; Safran, 1978: 581). 
Initially, this change may have been partly motivated by Kennedy's 
desire to check Israel's nuclear development programme and to prevent 
an out-of-control nuclear arms race between Israel and Egypt (Gazit, 
1983b: 49-56). But towards 1966, when attempts to appease Nasser 
seemed to be going nowhere, Kennedy's successor, President Johnson, 
began fortifying 'special relations' with the Israeli army, buttressed with 
large military shipments to counteract the growing Pan-Arabist threat. 
Despite his preoccupation with the intensifying Vietnam conflict, Johnson 
was worried about the fighting in Yemen, where Egyptian troops had on 
a number of occasions crossed the border into Saudi Arabia. After the 
end of US involvement in Libya and in the Congo, Washington ceased its 
economic support to Egypt and instead moved to give overt assistance to 
Israel, both economically and militarily. In 1966, at the height of its entan- 
glement in Vietnam, the United States began sending Israel heavy assault 
weapons, including tanks and aircraft, for the first time. 
In that year, Soviet involvement in the region seemed more threat- 
ening than ever. First, Britain announced it would soon be leaving Aden, 
notwithstanding the ongoing Soviet-backed war in neighbouring Yemen, 
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just south of the world's richest oil fields; then, the pro-Soviet Ba'ath 
party staged a coup in Syria; and finally, Kosygin was promoting a 
socialist union between Egypt, Syria, Algeria and Iraq, which would 
have engulfed Saudi Arabia from the west and north. Given its diffi- 
culties in Vietnam, the United States was not prepared to counteract 
these developments directly, but Israel certainly was and did. Towards 
the end of the year, the Arab-Israeli dispute was again heating up. In 
November, Israel staged a massive raid into the Jordanian town of 
Samoa, officially in retaliation for guerrilla attacks. Then, in April 1967, 
an Israeli tractor sent to cultivate a demilitarized zone just beneath the 
Golan Heights sparked a border skirmish which ended with humiliating 
Syrian losses. Adding insult to injury, the Israelis went on to announce 
their intention of forcibly dethroning the Damascus regime. Faced with 
mounting challenges to his Pan-Arab leadership, Nasser was more or 
less compelled to respond, moving two army divisions into the Sinai 
desert and closing the Straits of Tiran. There are, of course, other expla- 
nations. Aronson (1994), for example, sees the turn of events in a rather 
different light, arguing that the escalation was in fact an unintended 
consequence of Nasser trying to stop the development of nuclear 
weapons by Israel. But one way or the other, it is clear that the Americans 
(like the French and British before them) hoped that Israel would use 
the opportunity to topple Nasser, and the closing of the Tiran Straits 
now offered the pretext for a pre-emptive strike. 
Contrary to popular belief, the Israeli and American leaderships had 
little doubt about the outcome of the looming war.8 The certainty of 
Arab defeat was also known to Nasser - as well as to the other Arab 
participants - but given their internal disputes, they found it politically 
impossible to ignore Israeli provocations and were thus increasingly 
drawn towards a point of no return.9 Following the closure of the Straits 
of Tiran, Israel scheduled its attack for 25 May, but it had to wait until 
6 June, after Meir Amit, head of the Israeli Mossad, returned from an 
emergency trip to Washington with the 'green light' to 'break Nasser's 
bones asunder' (Haber, 1987: 214-16). And so, by maintaining its loyalty 
to US strategic interests in the region, Israel had finally succeeded in 
joining the US orbit as a formal satellite, a process which would further 
intensify during the 1970s and 1980s. 
Preoccupied with the 'free flow' of oil, the Petro-Core may have viewed 
the war's outcome as highly favourable: Soviet aspirations were under- 
mined and the cause of Pan-Arabism suffered a serious blow. However, 
the companies must also have noticed the positive effect the war had on 
their differential profitability (see Figures 2a and 2b) - an ominous sign 
that their 'free-flow' system was itself coming to an end.I0 And as if to 
hasten this process, the aftermath of the war was marked by increasing 
arms exports. Rewarded for its victory, Israel began receiving F-4 
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Phantom aircraft which were previously sold only to Britain and 
Germany. With this, the door was now open for an arms race of sophis- 
ticated weapons, a race which would eventually help 'limit' the flow of 
oil and introduce the petroleum business into the new era of 'crisis'. 
5 THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR 
The 1968 presidential elections in the United States brought a new 
administration which was very attuned to the coinciding interests of the 
Weapondollar-Petrodollar coalition. Nixon's campaigns were supported 
heavily (and not always legally) by contributions from both oil and 
armament companies (Sampson, 1975: 205-6; 1977: 151-52, 195), while 
his Secretary of State Kissinger enjoyed close connections with the 
Rockefellers and proposed an aggressive realpolitik which at more than 
one point entertained the feasibility of 'limited' nuclear war (Barnet, 
1983: 178-9)." In the eyes of the Nixon-Kissinger administration, the 
1967 war did little to secure US interests in the Middle East. Gaddafy's 
1969 showdown with the oil companies in Libya and the attempted coup 
in Saudi Arabia were disconcerting reminders of pending regional 
hazards, suggesting that, if anything, the United States should pay more 
rather than less attention to this troubled area. 
That, however, was easier said than done. In 1969, the United States 
began withdrawing its troops from Vietnam, and with warmer relations 
with China and the declaration of detente, the new 'Nixon Doctrine' 
called for a lower budgetary commitment to defence. Instead of 
Kennedy's strategy of preparing for '2% wars', Nixon and Kissinger 
offered resources for only '1% wars' and in 1969 domestic military 
spending started to fall. From a statist perspective, these budgetary 
constraints weakened US capabilities in the Middle East precisely as this 
region was about to become one of the most sensitive in the world (Gold, 
1993: 40). Moreover, Britain's withdrawal from its last stronghold in the 
Persian Gulf and the loss of the last US strategic air base in Libya created 
a regional vacuum. The solution, as stipulated by Kissinger, was for the 
United States to concentrate only on 'core conflicts', leaving 'peripheral 
conflicts' to be handled by local pro-American forces. The consequences 
were twofold. First, the United States embarked on massive arms 
exports, mainly to Israel and to the 'twin pillars' Iran and Saudi Arabia, 
and later also to Egypt and other countries. Second, State Department 
attempts at settling the Arab-Israeli conflict were now frustrated by 
White House support for Israel (Safran, 1978: ch. 23). With Middle 
Eastern affairs increasingly handled by Nixon and Kissinger rather than 
State Secretary Rogers (Kissinger, 1979: 1285, 1289), Israel was now used 
as a threat against anti-American Arab countries. Kissinger was partic- 
ularly intimidated by what he regarded as deliberate Soviet challenges, 
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and in 1970 worked out a plan together with Israeli Ambassador Rabin 
for a joint US-Israeli attack on Syria, which jeopardized King Hussein 
of Jordan. 
These observations do not sit well with the statist view. First, given 
the split between the conciliatory position of the State Department and 
the aggressive stance of the President, it is not clear what 'national 
interest' American policy makers were trying to achieve. Second, the 
type of cannon diplomacy entertained by Kissinger does not look partic- 
ularly conducive to regional stability. Indeed, according to Safran (1978: 
ch. 23), the United States continued to send arms to the region despite 
its own fears that an Israeli victory against Arab aggression would cause 
chaos and seriously disturb the flow of oil. 
Seen from the perspective of the Weapondollar-Petrodollar coalition, 
however, US foreign policy no longer looks so ambivalent. Declining 
military spending at home had an unambiguous negative impact on the 
large defence contractors (Sampson, 1977: 214-21), and with pressures 
from these embattled contractors coinciding with his own strategic 
outlook, Nixon took another step towards the commercialization of arms 
exports. His new doctrine stipulated that the burden of defending US 
allies - financially as well as in manpower - should now be borne by 
those allies themselves (Ferrari et al., 1987: 21). In order. to do that, 
explained military contractor David Packard (then acting as Deputy 
Secretary of Defense), the United States was ready to 'give or sell [to 
these allies] the tools they need for this bigger load we are urging them 
to assume' (quoted in Sampson, 1977: 243). In the Middle East, the Nixon 
Doctrine meant the dawn of a new arms race. Unable to pay for its 
rapidly rising military imports, Israel continued to receive most of them 
as aid - officially in order to restore the region's delicate 'balance of 
power' but arguably leading towards an opposite end.12 The most signif- 
icant developments, however, were on the Iranian front. 
With their newly acquired freedom to sell, US armament companies 
were actively courting the Shah of 1r& whom the US administration 
was now promoting as the 'policeman of the Gulf'. On their visit to 
Tehran in 1972, Nixon and Kissinger reputedly agreed to sell Iran 'virtu- 
ally any conventional arms it wanted' (cited in Sampson, 1977: 252). 
Given the decline in domestic military expenditures, this commitment 
was a much-needed lifeline for many of the largest defence contractors. 
The extent of arms exports, however, depended crucially on the petro- 
leum revenues of the Peacock Throne, something which both Nixon and 
Kissinger could not have failed to appreciate.13 And, indeed, the oil 
industry, too, was now undergoing a profound transformation. With 
weakening prices and falling profitability (see Figures 1 and 2a), the 
large petroleum companies came to realize the potential benefit of a 
stronger OPEC. The cartel's apparent resolve to control output impressed 
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the oil majors, and their London Oil Policy Group was now ready to . 
accept a new revenue-sharing agreement (Odell, 1979: 105, 215). But 
although the price of oil started to rise in 1971, the Petro-Core's rate of 
profit continued to linger and, in 1972, fell dangerously below the 
Fortune-500 'normal'. 
And then came the October 1973 'energy conflict'. The war brought a 
sharp increase in prices and restored the oil companies' differential prof- 
itability high above the big economy's average. At the same time, it also 
generated dramatic increases in the oil revenues of Arab countries with 
immediate consequences for the arms trade: in 1974, the Middle East 
surpassed South-East Asia as the world's largest market for imported 
weapons, with over one-third of the global trade. 
While there is no evidence to implicate the US administration as an 
instigator of the conflict, there are numerous indications that it did little 
to prevent it. The war did not catch the Nixon government by surprise. 
Warned by Faisal already at the beginning of 1973, the ARAMCO part- 
ners were aware of what was coming and they did not keep that 
knowledge to themselves (Blair, 1976: 266-8; Sampson, 1975: 243-8; and 
Yergin, 1991: 593-7). A similar message came from a CIA study (inci- 
dentally co-authored by the same analyst who anticipated that the 1967 
war would last only six days) which concluded that the Egyptians were 
planning to attack Israel (Cockburn and Cockburn, 1991: 171). Indeed, 
Kissinger was directly informed of the impending assault, both by 
Jordan's King Hussein (who between 1957 and 1977 was a paid CIA 
agent) and by sources close to Sadat (Neff, 1988: 105). 
These preliminary exchanges raise two related questions. If, as stipu- 
lated in the statist literature, Nixon and Kissinger were indeed concerned 
with maintaining regional stability, why did they not heed Saudi 
requests that the United States soften its support for Israel? To suggest 
that this was because the administration was by then irrevocably 
committed to the Israeli cause is not persuasive, for if that was the case, 
why did it fail to warn the Israelis of the coming calamity? Indeed, why 
did Kissinger caution Israel not to fire the first shot when it finally 
realized that Egypt and Syria were about to attack? One common inter- 
pretation is that Kissinger wanted the Arabs to win their self-respect 
and .some territory which would then be traded for peace through his 
own mediation (see, for example, Hersh, 1991: 227). However, from 
a statist point of view, Kissinger was walking on a tightrope here. 
The problem, according to his own admission, was how to achieve a 
'balanced' outcome - one in which the war ends after Israel recovers 
some of its earlier losses but before it has the chance to destroy its 
opponents. For Kissinger, this must have been a real problem. He had 
absolute confidence in Israel's military ability and feared that an Israeli 
victory would be devastating for US regional interests (possibly by 
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inciting leftist coups and encouraging Soviet intervention). Yet despite 
the obvious danger, he stuck to his plan, moving to broker a ceasefire 
only at the last moment, after Israel had threatened to use nuclear 
weapons (Safran, 1978: ch. 23). 
These covert ambiguities and the accompanying political acrobatics 
suggest that strategic considerations may have been only part of the 
story. Attuned to the plight of the oil and armament industries, it is not 
unlikely that Kissinger had also given some thought to the probable 
effect an oil crisis would have had on their coinciding interests. And, 
indeed, the unfolding of events after the war is not inconsistent with 
this conjecture. 
With the dual rise of inflowing petrodollars and outgoing weapon- 
dollars, the resolution of the Israeli-Arab conflict became decreasingly 
appealing. US diplomats were now more concerned with maintaining 
the region's 'balance of power'. Thus, the ambassador to Egypt recom- 
mended that the United States start sending weapons to that country, 
while his counterparts in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were explaining the 
merits of American-made aircraft to local rulers (New York Times, 21 June 
1975, cited in Frenkel, 1991: 76). Working now for the new Ford admin- 
istration but still pursuing his original plan, Kissinger helped to establish 
an 'interim agreement' between the warring factions. 
This time, the United States held the carrot as well as the stick: it 
could use Israel as a threat against pro-Soviet Arab regimes, but also 
force it to return occupied Arab land to those who promised to leave 
the Soviet orbit and cross the floor into the American side (Safran, 1978: 
ch. 25). This premise, which brought the end of the oil embargo, 
continues till the present and underlies much of the peace process of 
the 1990s. 
However, during the mid-1970s, with an eye to the background inter- 
ests of the Weapondollar-Petrodollar coalition, the administration was 
also careful to insist that interim agreements should not evolve into a 
comprehensive settlement. When in July 1975 the Israeli government 
appeared willing to go to a peace conference in Geneva, President Ford 
was quick to threaten that such a move would cause the withdrawal of 
US assistance (New York Times, 3 July 1975). The imperative of main- 
taining tension was spelled out clearly less than a year later. Appearing 
before the Jewish-American Congress in April 1976, Kissinger effectively 
asserted that a comprehensive Middle East peace depended not so much 
on the warring factions, but rather on the superpowers first agreeing on 
their respective spheres of influence (reported in Meyer, 1976: 157). 
These pursuits on the armament front help to shed some light on the 
apparently confused energy policy of the US administration during that 
period. Based on his analysis of over 1,000 State Department cables and 
papers obtained under the Freedom of Information Act, Yergin (1991: 
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84) concluded that, between 1974 and 1981, the US government in fact 
objected to higher oil prices. This conclusion seems consistent with the 
statist stand, but then Yergin simultaneously inferred that the govern- 
ment did not want to see those prices lowered either (ibid.: 643). In 
Yergin's opinion, this indecisiveness was rooted in a conflicting quest 
for lower energy costs at home, coupled with a richer and thus more 
stable Middle East. Yet how could this presumed search for stability be 
reconciled with massive US arms shipments whose dubious contribution 
to peace was questioned even by the administration itself? And what 
about the support of Kissinger and the International Energy Agency for 
a 'minimum safeguard pricef as a means of protecting western interests 
(Sampson, 1975: 306; Turner, 1983: 184). Yerginfs explanation implies 
that the US government was willing, in line with the realist view, to 
undermine the interests of both the large oil companies and the leading 
arms exporters. In light of available evidence, however, this hardly seems 
plausible. In our view, a more convincing straightforward interpretation 
is that the administration was in fact interested neither in lower oil prices 
nor in Middle East stability. By the mid-1970s, the interaction between 
petrodollars and weapondollars had already given rise to an increas- 
ingly powerful coalition with a vested interest in regional instability. 
Initially, these interests were somewhat blurred by the imaginative use 
of language to equate arms shipments with 'stabilization'.l4 Eventually, 
however, as the virtues of this Orwellian equation became decreasingly 
apparent, the true forces at play were coming into focus. 
The rising influence of the Weapondollar-Petrodollar coalition coin- 
cided with the new policies of Carter. Unlike Nixonfs, the 'Carter 
Doctrinef moved from emphasizing loyal regional forces (the 'twin 
pillarsf and Israel) to a reliance on direct military intervention. With 
growing nervousness on the part of the Saudi pillar - first in response 
to Soviet involvement in the Horn of Africa, and later as a consequence 
of Soviet participation in the Yemen conflict - Carter and his National 
Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski decided to build a 'Rapid 
Deployment Joint Task Forcef, or RDJTF (Long, 1985: 62). As they saw 
it, the lesson from the Iran affair was that the United States should not 
count on local proxies and must use its own forces to protect its own 
interests (Quandt, 1979: 543). This fitted well with the broader strategic 
rethinking in Washington. According to Brzezinski (1983: 454), events 
and decisions in 1979-80 had fundamentally altered the US global 
strategic position. The Middle East - which was previously seen as semi- 
neutral and protected from Soviet power by a defence belt comprising 
Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan - no longer seemed invincible. 
As a consequence, US dual commitments in Europe and the Far East 
were now supplemented by a third strategic commitment towards what 
came to be known as 'West Asiaf. The resources needed to support-this 
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new pledge, however, were unavailable and so in order to bypass 
Congressional objection, part of the military deployment was financed 
by Saudi petrodollars (Gold, 1993: 51). 
Thus, notwithstanding his desire to promote world peace, Carter was 
also subject to considerable pressure to act otherwise. At home, his was 
the first administration to raise domestic military spending after almost 
a decade of decline. In the international arena, Carter indeed announced 
a policy of restraints on arms exports which, in its first fifteen months, 
led to the cancellation of 614 requests from ninty-two countries worth 
over $1 billion (Ferrari et al., 1987: 25). Yet, despite these limitations, and 
contrary to the new statist stand on the principle of American 'self- 
defence', total US arms exports continued to increase (albeit more 
slowly), particularly to the Middle East. Somewhat paradoxically, Carter, 
who was often perceived as a peace-maker promoting conciliation in the 
region, was also the president who contributed the most towards 
opening the Arab market to US weaponry. In 1978, towards the Camp 
David Accord, he initiated the first 'combination deal', whereby US 
armament producers simultaneously equipped several warring factions - 
a pattern which was then promptly institutionalized by other arms- 
exporting countries as a means of promoting peace through arms sales.15 
6 THE 1979 IRANIAN REVOLUTION A N D  THE 
1980-8 IRAN-IRAQ WAR 
Yet the ongoing rearmament during the mid-1970s was merely sufficient 
to keep oil prices from falling, and in the absence of a serious upheaval, 
the Petro-Core's profitability in 1977 and 1978 again dropped into the 
'danger zone' below the big economy's average (see Figures 2a and 2b). 
By now, however, the key players must have been well aware of the 
impact on prices of a major crisis which, incidentally, was already in 
the making. The Islamic Revolution that began in 1978 failed to have a 
significant effect on the market, but the potential was clearly there. In 
this light, the involvement of the US administration in the onset of the 
1979 oil crisis is interesting: despite the delicate situation in Iran, Carter 
quickly granted asylum to the ousted Shah, thus triggering the hostage 
crisis. When Iran threatened to withdraw its US banking deposits, the 
President immediately retaliated by seizing Iranian assets. This sequence 
of events has given rise to allegations that the US government was 
unduly influenced by Carter's special relations with the Rockefellers who 
feared losing their extensive loans to Iran.16 
The hostage crisis in Iran sparked panic and the price of oil began to 
rise, but the regional upheaval continued. In late 1979, the Soviet Union 
invaded Afghanistan, and in 1980 the Iraqis attacked Iran. Oil prices 
were now climbing beyond $30 per barrel, pulling the Petro-Core's 
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profitability safely out of the 'danger zone'. And with Middle East oil 
revenues on the rise, the flow of imported weapons was also growing 
rapidly. To some extent, both the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq's 
assault on Iran were rooted in the rising threat of Islamic fundament- 
alism. However, there are indications that the US government had 
additional apprehensions which were not wholly antagonistic to the 
Khomeini regime. According to several sources analysed in Cockburn 
and Cockburn (1991: 317-18), during the last year of his administration, 
Carter embarked on a 'sting operation' which, if successful, would have 
both helped his re-election and caused the Iranians to renew their 
demand for American weapons. The underpinning of his strategy was 
relatively straightforward. With much of their sophisticated arsenal 
made in the United States, the Iranians were crucially dependent on 
US-made spare parts and ammunition. In this context, a major conflict 
(preferably starting before the 1980 elections) could convince Iran to 
release the hostages in return for American military resupply. The unsus- 
pecting carrier of that plan was Iraq's Saddam Hussein. With blessings 
from Jordan and Kuwait, promises of Saudi finances and, most impor- 
tantly, an indirect but clearly warm endorsement from Brzezinski, 
Hussein began to advance his forces into Iran.17 Unfortunately for Carter, 
the 'sting' was only partly successful. Once Iraq launched its attack, his 
administration condemned it and began soliciting the Iranians to trade 
hostages for spare parts. But that was too late. Apparently, Iran already 
had a secret agreement with the US Republican Party that the hostages 
be released only after the elections, so although the weapons were ready 
to flow, Carter was no longer there to benefit from it.18 The gains for 
the Weapondollar-Petrodollar coalition, however, were positive - in fact, . 
more so with Reagan in office than Carter. 
During Reagan's presidency, the Middle East was defined - in some 
sense paradoxically - as being increasingly important for the US 'nation- 
al interest'. In 1983, Reagan created a new military central command 
(CENTCOM) to include the entire area of 'West Asia' from India to the 
Horn of Africa.19 The reallocation of land forces within CENTCOM 
suggested a move from deterrence to defence, but at least initially, 
CENTCOM was incapable of countering a Soviet challenge even against 
the oil zone in southern Iran, not to mention a larger operation (Gold, 
1993: 69). More importantly, lacking the necessary funding, the new 
focus on West Asia had to come at the expense of American military 
commitments in Europe and East Asia - this at a time when the signif- 
icance to the United States of Middle East oil, as well as the Soviet 
danger, were in fact declining (see Section 7 below). 
Interestingly, though perhaps not surprisingly, this renewed pre- 
occupation with the 'Soviet menace' in the Middle East came as the 
power of the Weapondollar-Petrodollar coalition was reaching new 
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heights. Vice-President Bush - a former Director of the CIA and an oil 
millionaire in his own right - had a close acquaintance with the petro- 
leum industry and strong Texas ties. As his first Secretary of State, the 
President nominated Haig, previously a director of Chase Manhattan 
and president and chief executive officer of United Technol~gy.~~ Reagan 
also nominated Donald Regan, a partner and chairman of Merrill Lynch, 
as his Treasury Secretary. Merrill Lynch is one of the country's largest 
brokerage houses and, like Chase Manhattan and United Technology, 
has a special connection with the Middle East. In 1978, the company 
acquired White Weld, an international investment firm that advised the 
Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) on how to manage its $100 
billion portfolio and guided the investment of a daily inflow of about 
450 million petrodollars. As his Assistant Secretary for International 
Affairs, Regan nominated Mulford, who until then had managed White 
Weld's operations in Saudi Arabia (Business Week, 22 July 1985). Other 
oil-related appointments were the nomination of Volker as Chairman of 
the Federal Reserve Board, and then his replacement by Greenspan - 
the former was linked to the Rockefeller group and the latter was a 
director of both Mobil Oil and J. P. Morgan prior to his appointment. 
However, the most important representatives of the Weapondollar- 
Petrodollar coalition who found their way into the Reagan administra- 
tion were several veterans of the Bechtel Corporations - the world's 
largest contractor of military installations and energy-related projects.21 
Bechtel has had a long history of building political ties at home and 
abroad (cf. McCartney, 1989). Among other things, the company was the 
driving force behind the election campaigns of Hoover, Eisenhower and 
Reagan; it had close associates in the CIA (including Agency Directors 
McCone, Helms and Casey); it courted special relations with the Dulles 
brothers; and it has dominated decision making at the Atomic Energy 
Commission and the Export-Import Bank. On the international scene, 
Bechtel acted simultaneously as an arm of the CIA and as the unofficial 
representative of foreign governments, particularly Saudi Arabia, in the 
United States. These and numerous other connections (often supple- 
mented by substantial bribes and clandestine  operation^)^^ helped win 
Bechtel some of the world's largest construction projects. But what made 
these projects so valuable to begin with was the 'energy crisis' unfolding 
from the early 1970s. 
Bechtel entered the Middle East after the Second World War as a major 
contractor for the ARAMCO partners, but until the consolidation of 
OPEC its activities in the region remained restricted by the limited 
petrodollar earnings of local governments. With the price explosion of 
the early 1970s, however, came a growing flow of contracts, including 
the construction of natural gas projects in Algeria and Abu Dhabi, power 
stations in Cairo, and refineries, airports and entire petrochemical cities 
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in Saudi Arabia. In addition, many of the company's other energy-related 
projects - such as Quebec's hydroelectric James Bay complex, the Alaska 
oil pipeline, Indonesia's liquefied natural gas facilities and nuclear 
reactor plants in the United States and elsewhere - were themselves 
partly the consequence of rising oil prices. The company also became a 
major constructor of military installations, mainly for US forces, but also 
for other sovereigns, particularly in cash-rich Arab countries. 
By the early 1980s, Bechtel's international operations had risen to over 
one-half of its business, and the person who had guided this transition 
since the mid-1970s was the company's president George Shultz. 
Towards the 1980 election, Shultz became concerned with the proposed 
policies of Ronald Reagan who vowed to make government smaller. 
Such policies would have seriously threatened Bechtel's business, but 
after a series of 'coordination meetings' with Bechtel executives and asso- 
ciates of the Rockefeller group, the presidential candidate had modified 
his stance sufficiently to make Shultz an unreserved supporter. Once in 
office, Reagan began to draw on the talent of Bechtel officials. As his 
initial Defense Secretary, he chose Weinberger, until then a Bechtel vice- 
president, and in 1982 he asked Shultz to replace Haig as Secretary of 
State. Other Bechtel veterans with key positions in the new administra- 
tion included Allen (National Security Advisor), Davis (Deputy Secretary 
of Energy) and Habib (who was acting as Reagan's Special Envoy to the 
Middle East while still on Bechtel's payroll). 
The convergence of oil and armament interests in the Reagan admin- 
istration was paralleled to some extent in their own boardrooms, mainly 
through interlocking directorships. For example, during the 1980s, the 
chairman and chief executive officer of Standard Oil of Indiana 
(Swearingen) was a director of both Chase Manhattan and Lockheed; the 
board of directors of McDomell Douglas included a director of Phillips 
Petroleum (Chetkovich) and a director of Shell Canada (McDonald); the 
chairman and president of United Technologies (Gray) was a director of 
both Exxon and Citibank; Boeing shared one director with Mobil and 
three with Chevron, including the latter's chairman (Keller); and the 
Chevron board included a director from Allied Signal (Hills) and the 
president and chief executive of Hewlett Packard (Yound) (Moody's 
Industrial Manuals; Adams, 1982). Such interlocks facilitate a sharing of 
common interests and they serve as an informal mechanism for the 
transmission of views that permit strategic action to be coordinated. 
Whether the oil and armament corporations indeed cooperated in 
order to advance their common Middle East interests remains an open 
question, but the policies of the Reagan administration certainly seem 
consistent with such an endeavour. At home, Reagan helped to consol- 
idate the Weapondollar-Petrodollar coalition by embarking on the 
largest defence build-up in peace time while simultaneously reducing 
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corporate taxes. The result was a rapidly rising budget deficit - but for 
the arms and oil business this meant much larger earnings.23 And in 
the Middle East, the new administration continued the policies of its 
predecessors, though apparently with much greater vigour. Instead of 
Carter's approach that arms exports should be an 'exceptional foreign 
policy implement', Reagan took the view that they were 'an essential 
element of [US] global defence posture and an indispensable component 
of its foreign policy', and moved to eliminate many of the restrictions 
previously imposed on them (US Congress, Office of Technology 
Assessment, 1991: 20). However, in order to pay for the outgoing 
weapons (the administration was increasingly incapable, both financially 
and politically, of delivering them as aid), there was a need to continue 
nourishing Middle East 'energy conflicts', a task to which Reagan turned 
with little delay. 
In Iran, the administration was quickly implicated in the so-called 
Iran-Contra Affair. Building on the earlier success in freeing the embassy 
hostages in Tehran, the United States was now sending weapons in 
return for the release of hostages captured in Lebanon by Iranian-backed 
forces (and for cash payments which were then partly diverted to finance 
the Contra rebels in Nicarag~a) .~~ However, these aspects of the scheme 
were only part of the picture. Another goal, less publicized though 
certainly no less important, was to enable Iran to hold against Iraq - but 
only just, so that the war could continue without a victor.25 Arms ship- 
ments to sustain the Iranian war effort - in excess of $500 million 
annually according to some estimatesz6 - were handled by Israel. At the 
same time, the Americans also kept promoting the Iraqi cause. This was 
done in a variety of ways: by renewing diplomatic relations; by 
providing military intelligence; by granting low-interest loans; by 
encouraging Saudi financial assistance; by asking the Gulf states and 
Egypt to deliver more than $1.5 billion worth of arms and ammunition; 
and, finally, by allowing over $5 billion of US credit - partly guaran- 
teed by the Agriculture Department - to be covertly (and possibly 
fraudulently) used for Iraqi purchases of US machinery and technology 
with military and nuclear applications (Business Week, 13 July 1992; Waas 
and Unger, 1992). To facilitate payments for the war effort, it was 
suggested in 1984 that Bechtel construct a multibillion-dollar pipeline 
from Kirkuk to the Jordanian port of Aqaba which would help to make 
Iraqi oil shipments safe from the hazards of the Gulf. The undertaking 
was endorsed by CIA Director Casey and in order to guarantee the 
project against Israeli bombardment, Bechtel sought additional help from 
a number of key figures, including Swiss oil magnate Rappoport, 
Attorney General Meese and National Security Advisor McFarlane. 
Rappoport, with his reputed CIA connections and a long-term friend- 
ship with Israeli Prime Minister Peres, was able to obtain a written Israeli 
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promise not to attack the pipeline in return for an overall premium of 
about $650 million - payable in ten equal annual instalments which 
would then be partly diverted to Peres's Labour Party. To secure the 
arrangement further, Peres was willing to freeze in a 'salvage fund' $400 
million out of US military aid to Israel, and Meese and McFarlane 
laboured to arrange that the scheme be approved by the Overseas Pri- 
vate Investment Corporation (Business Week, 22 February 1988; Frenkel, 
1991: 30-4). 
In the end, for reasons which are still not entirely clear, Iraq decided 
not to proceed with the project. In a certain sense, however, the cancel- 
lation was part of a new trend of declining exports to the Middle East. 
The reason was twofold: since 1980, Middle East oil production had 
begun to drop sharply and then, in 1982, the price of oil too started to 
fall. The net result was a sharp decline in the region's oil revenues - 
from $197 billion in 1980 to a mere $52 billion by 1986 - and a con- 
sequent reduction in the demand for civilian and military imports 
(United Nations, S fa tis tical Yearbook, 1980, 1986).27 These developments 
were not entirely surprising. A decade of 'crisis' was finally having its 
effect on the demand for oil, particularly through the development of 
alternative energy sources and improved energy efficien~y.~~ High prices 
were also affecting the production side, inducing an increase in non- 
OPEC exploration and a consequent growth of reserves and output. In 
addition, there were growing cleavages between the large oil companies 
and their host countries, as the latter (particularly Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait) were beginning to diversify into downstream activities of 
refining, transportation and marketing (Business Week, 12 September 
1983, 7 March 1988, 21 March 1988,17 October 1988; Time, 27 July 1988). 
And finally but perhaps most importantly, the Iraq-Iran War was 
decreasingly seen as a 'threat' for western energy supplies. 
In some important respects, the situation in the early 1980s differed 
from that which prevailed after the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. In the earlier 
conflict, the anti-Israel alliance of the Arab countries lent credibility to 
the threat of the 'oil weapon' and helped to augment fears of a future 
shortage. By the 1980s, however, the OPEC front was no longer united 
and two important members of the cartel were themselves military foes. 
The disturbances occurring in the Persian Gulf, particularly the so-called 
'tanker war' and attacks on oil ports, aroused nervousness in the oil 
market and perhaps exerted a positive influence on oil prices. Yet rivalry 
prevailed instead of cooperation, and with the prolongation of hostili- 
ties in the Gulf, the likelihood of reorganizing OPEC to restore its earlier 
cohesion diminished. Indeed, the overriding need of both Iran and Iraq 
for new weapons and ammunition only intensified the problem as the 
two countries stretched their production to the limit in order to finance 
their war effort.29 The Iraq-Iran War thus contributed towards a new 
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situation of falling oil prices with potentially detrimental implications for 
the Weapondollar-Petrodollar coalition. 
Initially, Saudi Arabia agreed to provide a 'cushion' for the oil revenues 
of other OPEC members by selling its own output at the cartel's official 
price and by adjusting its production to eliminate the pressure of exces- 
sive supply on this official price. The cost for the Saudis was substantial 
- they had to reduce output from around 10 million barrels per day in 
1981, to about 3.5 million in 1982 and, finally, to a mere 2 million in 1985 
(Time, 17 February 1986) - but the strategy failed to stop the price decline. 
Eventually, Saudi Arabia reversed its stance and started to raise output, 
thus aggravating the panic and causing prices to tumble even further. 
With the price of crude oil dropping below $10 per barrel in 1986, 
the Petro-Core's rate of return was now once again in the 'danger zone' 
(see Figures 2a and 2b). At that point, Vice-President Bush was sent 
to the Middle East with the task of openly asking Saudi Arabia to 
reconsider its actions and reinstate lower levels of production. Bush 
insisted that the government of the United States was 'fundamentally, 
irrevocably committed' to maintaining the free flow of oil and 'the inter- 
est in the United States is bound to be cheap energy prices'. However, 
the Vice-President also emphasized that '[there] is some point at which 
the national security interests of the United States say, "Hey, we must 
have a strong, viable domestic interest"' (New York Times, 7 April 1986). 
The US administration had another reason to worry about develop- 
ments in the Middle East: lower oil prices meant an overall reduction 
in arms exports to the region, and as if to make a bad situation even 
worse, US exporters suffered further by losing market share to rival 
companies based in other countries. The general trend is evident from 
the distribution of arms transfers to the Middle East given in Table 1. 
Until the late 1970s, the market was clearly dominated by the two super- 
powers, but from the early 1980s there was a rapid intrusion of other 
suppliers from Europe, China and the developing countries. Despite the 
considerable relaxation of export restrictions under Reagan, the United 
States has remained the last country among the major arms suppliers in 
which the export of weapons was still not entirely subjugated to commer- 
cial considerations. Thus, with the exception of covert shipments, the 
loss of the Iranian market and the government ban on exports to Iraq 
effectively excluded US-based firms from supplying the Iran-Iraq 
conflict which proved to be the most expensive armed conflict since the 
Vietnam War.30 The gap created by the absence of the United States was 
quickly filled by suppliers from another fifty-two countries, which often 
supplied both Iran and Iraq sim~ltaneously.~~ What made these develop- 
ments particularly worrisome for the Arma-Core was that they occurred 
precisely at the time when domestic military procurement in the United 
States began to decline after a decade of ongoing increases. 
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Table 2 Arms exports to the Middle East 
Distribution by source (percentage of total)" 
- -- - -- - - 
Period Total United States Soviet Union/ Others 
($ million) Russiab 
Source: US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (1975: 70,1980: 160,1985: 134,1993-4: 
148); US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis (1991: Table 550, 340). 
Notes: 
a Totals may not add up to 100 per cent because of rounding. 
Russia from 1992. 
Data for the United States are for fiscal years. Total does not include the resupply 
effort to Israel following the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. 
For US-based producers, the shifting market shares meant a change 
in the underlying relationships between oil revenues and arms imports, 
as illustrated in Figure 3. The chart relates the dollar value of arms deliv- 
eries into the region in a given year (t) - from all sources as well as 
from the United States alone - to the overall level of Middle East oil 
income three years earlier (t-3), with all data denominated in constant 
1987 prices (as we explained in Nitzan and Bichler, 1995, changes in oil 
income have an immediate effect on the level of import agreements, but 
the weapons are usually delivered only later, with an average lag of three 
years). The comparison shows clearly that while the effect of oil income 
on total arms deliveries remained more or less stable, towards the early 
1980s the impact on imports originated in the United States shifted down- 
wards. So although overall arms exports were still dependent on the 
region's petrodollar revenues, a larger share of those revenues was now 
flowing to firms based outside United States. 
Together, the combination of a weakening oil market and a relative 
decline of US-based weapon exporters created powerful pressure 
towards a new 'energy conflict' in the Middle East, a conflict which 
would hopefully restore the sagging profitability of the large oil com- 
panies and re-establish the leading role of American-made military 
hardware and construction services. 
7 THE 1990-91 GULF W A R  
From a statist perspective, however, the US administration had little 
reason to embark on an aggressive Middle East campaign. Indeed, 
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Arms imports ( 1 )  
30 
200 300 
Oil income (1-3) 
Figure 3 Middle East oil income and a m  imports, 1963-89 ($ billion, 1987 
prices) 
Source: Middle East oil income for the 1964-78 period is computed from American 
Petroleum Institute data as reported in Bina (1985: Table 27, 131-2) and from BP Statistical 
Review of World Energy (various years); for the 1979-89 period, income is assumed equal 
to the region's oil exports, taken from the UN Statistical Yenrbwk (various years). Total 
arms imports are from US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (various years). Current 
price series are deflated by the US GDP price deflator from US Congress, Economic Report 
of the President (1993: Table 53,352). Arms imports from the United States are from Ferrari 
et al. (1987: Chart 2,6). Original constant price data with 1985 as a base year were converted 
to a base year of 1987. 
according to the analysis in Gold (1993: 75), during Reagan's second 
term in office the Middle East was becoming less important for the United 
States. First, after their entanglement in Afghanistan, the Soviets were 
no longer perceived as marching towards the Straits of Hormuz. Second, 
the expansion of non-OPEC output, together with greater conservation 
and new energy-saving technologies, lowered the significance of 
imported Middle East oil. Third, and most important, the experience 
of the Iran-Iraq War seemed to suggest that regional conflicts could 
linger without having a detrimental effect on the price or availability 
of oil. Nevertheless, the administration continued to insist that the 
Persian Gulf was vital to US interests. In a speech given in 1987, Secretary 
of Defence Weinberger emphasized the long-term sigruhcance of the 
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Middle East, reminding his audience that it still contained 70 per cent 
of the world's proven reserves. The role of the United States, he said, 
was to assure the region was secure, stable and, above all, free from 
Soviet influence and intervention. According to strict guidelines issued 
by Weinberger, the US military was practically prevented from inter- 
vening in any conflict short of a world war. The only exception was 
the Middle East which, despite the above considerations, was deemed 
sufficiently important to warrant direct American military intervention 
(ibid.: 76). 
Seen from the perspective of the Weapondollar-Petrodollar coalition, 
however, an aggressive US policy was in fact all but crucial. The 
declining significance of Middle East oil, the inability of the Iraq-Iran 
conflict to raise or even maintain prices and the weakening arms exports 
of US producers were the very reasons why, for these firms, a stronger 
American 'stand' in the region was almost indispensable. And so, in 
1986, when Vice-President Bush was on his mission to Saudi Arabia in 
an effort to raise oil prices by peaceful means, the US administration 
was also embarking on a new trend of growing direct military involve- 
ment in the region - a development which eventually culminated four 
years later in Operation Desert Storm.32 
The first target was Libya's ruler Colonel Gaddafy, who was increas- 
ingly blamed for fostering international terrorism. A Sixth Fleet armada 
of more than forty-five warships, including three aircraft carriers with 
over 200 planes, was dispatched in March to 'enforce the principle of 
freedom of the seas' against Gaddafy's extension of Libya's territorial 
waters to the 32nd parallel. But as US administration officials later 
acknowledged, the real purpose of the operation, code-named Prairie 
Fire, was rather different. The plan was to provoke a military response 
by Libya, against which the US forces would then retaliate with esca- 
lating counter-strikes - including the destruction of the Libyan air force 
and bombing raids on the country's oil fields. Gaddafy, however, failed 
to pick up the bait and did not respond in any meaningful way (The 
Gazette, 29 March 1986; Time, 7 April 1986). A new opportunity arose a 
month later after a terrorist attack on a West Berlin discotheque ended 
with numerous injuries and one dead American soldier. The blame for 
the attack was immediately put on Libya and the fleet was sent once 
again towards Gaddafy's 32nd 'line of death'. But the Libyan ruler, 
whom Reagan called the 'mad dog of the Middle East', held his fire and 
the military exchange was limited (Time, 21 April 1986). Incidentally, the 
Syrians, who were also blamed for being involved in the West German 
bombing, came out against 'US aggression' in Libya and there were 
increasing reports about heightening Israeli-Syrian tensions (Time, 26 
May 1986). The attempted escalation continued when, in August, infor- 
mation leaked by the administration to the Wall Street Journal suggested 
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that the United States and Libya were again 'on a collision course' (Time, 
13 October 1986). 
This policy of confrontation was presented as part of a new, stronger 
US stand against radical Middle East regimes. In 1987, however, Reagan 
abruptly abandoned the Libyan cause, shifting his focus back to the 
Persian Gulf. The official reason was again the Soviets. The 'tanker war', 
which since 1980 had already accounted for over 300 damaged oil 
vessels, was suddenly made into a top priority after the Kuwaitis 
requested US protection for their oil vessels in the Gulf. Initially, the 
administration appeared reluctant, but then quickly reversed its stance 
once the Kuwaitis turned to the Soviet Union (Gold, 1993: 79-104; 
Darwish and Alexander, 1991: 244-5). This, however, was only part of 
the story. Since the beginning of 1986, the administration was raising 
increasing concerns that Iran was getting the upper hand in its six-year 
war with Iraq. But then in November of that year, the Iran-Contra Affair 
began to unravel, suggesting that the US government was in fact 
contributing, and rather illegally, to the Iranian military cause. The 
embarrassing revelations forced the administration to reiterate its resolve 
against the Khomeini regime, and the Kuwaiti request provided the right 
opportunity. The Seventh Fleet assumed the role of protecting Kuwaiti 
tankers and now actively engaged with Iranian forces, attacking Iranian 
oil installations. 
The intensified conflict and growing US involvement drew the more 
moderate Gulf states deeper into the militarization process. Countries 
such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Oman were 
now seeking to purchase more US-made weapons and the Reagan 
administration was not inclined to refuse their requests.33 The Congress, 
however, was less forthcoming and managed to block several large 
proposed  deal^.^ Eventually, the Gulf states signed contracts with other 
suppliers and, in July 1988, US-based companies suffered the strongest 
setback when the United Kingdom signed the 'deal of the century' to 
supply Saudi Arabia with $25 billion worth of military hardware, 
construction and technical support over the next two decades (Business 
Week, 12 September 1988). The end of the Iraq-Iran War in 1988 opened 
new business opportunities for companies which could help to rebuild 
the war-shattered infrastructures of the two countries. The scope of the 
work was fairly substantial - estimated at the time to exceed $200 billion 
- but here too US corporations were facing fierce competition from non- 
US rivals (Business Week, 29 August 1998). 
And so, when President Bush assumed power in 1989, the Middle 
East situation was still troublesome for the Weapondollar-Petrodollar 
coalition. Some of the coalition's representatives in the government were 
by now gone, but their successors were in most cases equally aware of 
the oil and armament interests at stake.35 Despite a more direct US 
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involvement in the region, the price of oil had not recovered signifi- 
cantly. The rate of profit for the Petro-Core was still in the 'danger zone' 
below the big economy's 'normal' (see Figures 2a and 2b), and meagre 
petrodollar earnings by Middle East producers led to a lower demand 
for imported weapons, particularly from US companies. The gravity 
of the situation was succinctly summarized in February 1990 by the 
head of CENTCOM, General Schwarzkopf. Appearing in front of the 
Senate Armed Forces Committee, Schwarzkopf explained the crucial 
and growing significance of Middle East oil and warned of the im- 
pending danger to the west if one of the thirteen ongoing conflicts 
was to develop into a full-fledged war. At the same time, he also 
recommended that the United States increase its military exports to the 
region in order to match the disturbing advance in the market share of 
non-US producers. On the day of Schwarzkopf's speech, a 'prime 
Pentagon source' suggested to the Wall Street Journal that, with the 
change in east-west relations, the United States might now divert 
some of the funds previously used to maintain its European forces 
towards improving its ability to protect Saudi Arabia (cited in Frenkel, 
1991: 9-13). 
This prescience coming only six months before the onset of the 1990-1 
Gulf crisis implies that the US government could not have been too 
surprised by the subsequent turn of events. Indeed, according to James 
Akins, a former US ambassador to Saudi Arabia, and Joyce Starr, a senior 
associate at the Centre for Strategc and International Studies in 
Washington, the crisis was part of a 'long-term master plan to establish 
American military control over the world's richest oil fields'. The outline 
of the crisis, Akins and Starr point out, was in fact anticipated already 
during the mid-1970s in a Commentary article written by Robert Tucker 
of Johns Hopkins University, and in a Harper's magazine essay by an 
anonymous defence consultant with the pseudonym of Miles Ignotus. 
The latter even offered a scenario of direct US military intervention 
triggered by 'an Arab embargo or supply cut, an atmosphere of crisis, 
most probably in the aftermath of a short but bloody war. Then we go 
in . . . ' (The Gazette, 10 November 1990). 
Although there is no direct evidence in support of this thesis, the 
indirect evidence seems ample. To begin with, such a 'sting' operation 
would not be inconsistent with previous US actions in the Middle East, 
including, for example, the events leading to the 1967 Arab-Israeli War 
and to the Iraqi attack on Iran in 1980. Second, from 1986, the Reagan 
and Bush administrations were actively seeking excuses for direct US 
intervention, first in Libya and then against Iran. And, third, the 
unfolding of events prior to the Iraqi invasion into Kuwait leave the 
impression that the United States did not go out of its way to prevent 
the coming hostilities. 
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In April 1990, the Pentagon identified Iraq as the only military threat 
large enough to justify prevailing defence spending (Cockburn and 
Cockburn, 1991: 354-5) and, indeed, a month later Saddam Hussein 
started threatening his Gulf neighbours with the dire consequences of 
their oil policies. With the Iran-Iraq War over, Hussein was under 
increasing financial strain - having to cope with an $80 billion debt 
precisely at a time when he needed to rebuild his economy and army. 
To alleviate the pressure, he demanded that the Gulf states forgive the 
Iraqi debt and supply additional funds - which Hussein claimed was 
the least they could do to repay him for his 'protection' against the 
fundamentalist threat from Iran (Darwish and Alexander, 1991: chs 
9-11). But the centrepiece of Hussein's strategy was for OPEC to reduce 
output and raise prices, a policy which Saudi Arabia, the Gulf emirates 
and particularly Kuwait opposed - partly in order to limit Iraq's rear- 
mament aspirations and partly because Kuwaiti oil incomes were by 
now sufficiently diversified into downstream operations to benefit from 
more moderate crude oil prices (Darwish and Alexander, 1991: 256-65; 
Frenkel, 1991: 15-18; Business Week, 7 March 1988; 21 January 1991). 
Hussein's eventual decision to capture Kuwait (effectively trying to 
resolve overproduction by a 'merger') may have been influenced by a 
variety of considerations which cannot be analysed here, but it is highly 
doubtful that he would have invaded knowing the United States would 
retaliate with force. 
By July, with the build-up of Iraqi forces along the Kuwaiti border 
becoming all too evident, the United States deployed several combat 
ships on joint manoeuvres with the United Arab Emirates; but apart 
from these manoeuvres its message to Iraq was ambiguous and, at times, 
even encouraging. To learn more on the American position, Hussein 
summoned the US ambassador, April Glaspie. In the interview which 
was held on 25 July, a week before the invasion, Hussein explained his 
grievances against Kuwait, noting quite explicitly that Iraq intended to 
'take one by one' its disregarded rights. Glaspie replied that the dispute 
was an internal Arab matter on which the United States had 'no posi- 
tion' and that she had a 'direct instruction from the President to seek 
better relations with Iraq'. When Hussein mentioned his demand that 
OPEC push the price of oil over $25 per barrel, Glaspie chose to respond 
that there were many Americans who would also like to see the price 
go above that level. On 28 July, Bush reportedly sent a message to 
Hussein that the use of force against Kuwait was unacceptable, but three 
days later Under-Secretary of State Kelly said to reporters that the United 
States had 'no defence treaties with any Gulf countries'. On 1 August, 
despite the CIA'S conclusion that an Iraqi attack was imminent, the 
United States still failed to voice any explicit warning (Darwish and 
Alexander, 1991 : 267-75). 
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The American stance changed drastically, however, once the Iraqis 
began crossing the Kuwaiti border on 2 August. Three days after the 
invasion, Defense Secretary Cheney and General Schwarzkopf convinced 
the Saudi royal family that their kingdom was Hussein's next target - 
a most implausible presumption by all counts, as US officials later 
admitted - and persuaded them to invite the deployment of 'infidelf 
forces on their land, something which until then the Saudis had always 
managed to avoid (Woodward, 1991: ch. 19). During the following 
months, Hussein apparently attempted to seek a face-saving diplomatic 
resolution, but to no avail. The negotiations failed at least partly due to 
a strong American reluctance to forgo the opportunities offered by open 
confrontation. 
And, indeed, the consequences of the war were largely beneficial for 
the Weapondollar-Petrodollar coalition. The initial rise in the price of 
crude oil - from around $14 per barrel in 1990 to nearly $40 just before 
the onset of Operation Desert Storm - helped to pull the Petro-Core's 
profitability above the big economy's average (see Figures 2a and 2b). 
In 1991, the price per barrel declined to an average of $22 (which, inci- 
dentally, was not much below what Hussein demanded on the eve of 
his invasion), but that was still sufficient to keep the Petro-Core out of 
the 'danger The price revival raised Middle East oil revenues, 
and although their level was still far below that of the early 1980s, the 
war created a new sense of anxiety, particularly in Saudi Arabia and the 
adjacent sheikhdoms, thus driving them to convert a larger share of their 
petrodollars into weapondollars. 
This time, the main beneficiaries were US firms, whose exports to the 
region surged by 45 per cent in just three years - from $13.6 billion in 
1989, to $19.6 billion by 1992.37 Part of the increase was in the export of 
civilian goods and services, mainly to Kuwait. During its short occupa- 
tion, the Iraqi army engaged in a systematic plunder of Kuwait, stealing 
according to some estimates $20-50 billion worth of goods. In addition, 
it also left behind war damages which could eventually cost up to $100 
billion to repair. Perhaps not surprisingly, some of the largest recon- 
struction contracts went to Bechtel, beginning with a $1 billion task of 
extinguishing the 650 oil fires ignited by the retreating Iraqi army, and 
continuing with the multibillion job of restoring oil production, repairing 
refineries and rebuilding damaged infrastructure (Business Week, 18 
February 1991,6 March 1991,ll March 1991,17 February 1992; Fortune, 
25 March 1991). Most of the export increase, however, was in the 
category of military goods and services, which rose dramatically to rein- 
state the United States once again as the region's prime supplier. 
On 6 March 1991, while addressing a joint session of Congress after 
the Iraqi surrender, Bush exclaimed that 'it would be tragic if the nations 
of the Middle East and Persian Gulf were now, in the wake of the war, 
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to embark on a new arms race' (New York Times, 7 March 1991). Then, 
on 30 May, he went further, calling the major arms-exporting countries 
to establish guidelines 'for restraints on destabilizing transfers of conven- 
tional arms' to the Middle East (New York Times, 30 March 1991). In 
parallel, however, the President also insisted that it was 'time to put an 
end to micro-management of foreign and security assistance programs, 
micro-management that humiliates our friends and allies and hamstrings 
our d ip l~macy ' .~~  And so, in line with the principles of-free enterprise, 
the administration instructed American embassies to expand their assis- 
tance to US-based military contractors, and even proposed to alter the 
1968 Arms-Exports Control Act so that the Export-Import Bank could 
guarantee $1 billion in loan-financing for US arms exports.39 True to the 
time-honoured strategy of 'stabilization through military exports', Bush 
proposed in January 1991 (while the Gulf War was still going) that the 
United States sell Saudi Arabia over $20 billion worth of armament - a 
deal which was so large that the administration eventually had to 'slice' 
it into smaller contracts in order to facilitate Congressional approval (US 
Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, 1991: 21). 
And so, by 1990, after a decade of losing ground to rival sellers, the 
United States surpassed the Soviet Union as the largest weapon exporter 
to developing coun t r i e~ .~  According to the US Department of Defense, 
export agreements signed under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) 
Program during the 1990-2 period totalled $51.3 billion - up 83 per cent 
from their total of $28.1 billion in the previous three-year period (US 
Defense Security Assistance Agency, 1992: 2-3). This trend continues, 
and in 1993, US arms export deals set a new record of $32 billion, more 
than twice their 1992 level (Congressional Research Service, reported in 
The Economist, 13 August 1994). The American 'comeback' was especially 
pronounced in the Middle East, so much so that it prompted British offi- 
cials to complain openly that the United States was 'monopolizing' the 
region's arms trade (The Independent, 13 December 1992). 
For the Weapondollar-Petrodollar coalition, the 1990-1 Gulf War was 
significant also beyond its short-term benefits. In a certain respect, the 
war marked the closing of a circle in the relationships between the 
region's oil-producing countries and the western, mainly US-based oil 
companies. One central aspect of this relationship is illustrated in Figure 
4, where we chart the ratio between the oil income of Middle Eastern 
countries and the net profits earned by the six Petro-Core companies. 
During the 1960s and 1970s, rising Arab nationalism seemed to herald 
the decline of the oil companies which had previously dominated the 
region (on the 'demise thesis', see Nitzan and Bichler, 1995). With the 
ascent of OPEC and the nationalization of the region's oil resources came 
a dramatic increase in government oil revenues, and although this was 
accompanied by much larger petroprofits for the large oil firms, the 
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relative position of the host countries improved significantly. As we can 
see in the chart, the ratio of Middle East oil revenues to the Petro-Core's 
profit rose from less than unity in the early 1960s, to 11.9 by 1977. But 
since then the trend has reversed, with the ratio of petroleum revenues 
to petroprofits dropping to a low of 3.5 by 1990. Part of the reason was 
that lower crude oil prices during the 1980s affected the oil-producing 
countries more than they did the companies (in most cases, the former 
depend almost exclusively on upstream earnings, whereas the latter can 
offset some of the decline in extraction by the gains from cheaper inputs 
in refining). The main reason, however, was that from the late 1970s and 
particularly during the early 1980s, Middle East countries were 
attempting to stabilize prices by cutting their own output. Yet this was 
more than compensated by rising non-OPEC production where the 
private oil companies had a substantial stake - so the net effect was to 
augment company profits on account of receding Middle East earnings. 
Indirectly, the 1990-1 Gulf War 'institutionalized' this decline of the 
host countries. During the 1950s and 1960s, the large petroleum com- 
panies were faced with increasing competitive challenges and, as we 
argued in Nitzan and Bichler (1995), their survival was in fact assisted 
by the growing politicization of the petroleum oil business and the 
accompanying 'energy crises' of the 1970s and early 1980s. But this 
Figure 4 Ratio of Middle East oil receipts to the net profits of the Petro-Core 
Source: For Middle East oil receipts, see Figure 3. For net profit of the Petro-Core, see 
Figure 2a. 
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politicization - despite its positive effect on profitability - meant that 
the oil companies had to share the control of output and prices with 
the newly empowered OPEC countries, and this they probably never 
fully accepted. Seen from the companies' point of view, the Gulf War 
changed things for the better. Although they retained their formal sover- 
eignty, the oil policies of some of the Middle East's most important 
suppliers - notably Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and surrounding sheikhdoms 
- were now effectively subordinated to US dictates. Having realized 
that they are unable to defend themselves (and apprehensive that the 
Damascus Defence Agreement with Egypt and Syria might pose its own 
danger), these countries were now signing formal defence treaties with 
the United States and other western governments. And so, two decades 
after they were 'dethroned', the oil companies are again situated to have 
a primary role in determining Middle East oil policy. The front window 
still belongs to OPEC, but behind the scenes the demonstrated efficacy 
of US gunboat diplomacy (reformulated now as 'protection services') 
supports a more prominent role for the western oil companies. 
8 TOWARDS A NEW 'ENERGY CONFLICT'? 
From a statist perspective, the 1990s appear to have brought the United 
States closer than it ever was to securing its 'national interest' in the 
Middle East. After the 1990-1 Gulf War, the United States embarked on 
a 'peace blitz' to promote reconciliation between Israel and its Arab 
neighbours. As of 1995, Israel has signed peace treaties with the PLO 
and Jordan, established diplomatic relations with Morocco and warm - 
if informal - relations with some of the Gulf emirates, and is negotiating 
the crucial agreement with Syria. The Gulf states have endorsed US 
protection, and access to their oil at low prices seems assured. A full 
analysis of this process is of course somewhat premature, but the thrust 
of it seems clear enough. 
First, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rapid capitaliza- 
tion of the 'emerging economies' in Asia, Latin America and eastern 
Europe, Middle East governments feel compelled to open their own 
economies to trade and investment. Soviet aid and military support are 
gone for good (Russia now demands full payment for its weapons and 
other exports), and the attention of the industrial countries is increas- 
ingly diverted to countries like China, India and Brazil. Under this new 
world order, many Arab elites have realized they must join the global 
market or risk the spectre of economic crises and internal turmoil. Israel, 
too, was in a similar predicament, although its own situation is now 
far more comfortable. Until the mid-1980s, the Israeli economy was 
characterized by a tight oligopolistic structure in which differential 
accumulation by the largest conglomerates was supported through a 
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regime of high military spending and rapid inflation (Bichler and Nitzan, 
1996). Since the late 1980s, however, it has become increasingly evident 
that this economic order is no longer sustainable (Nitzan and Bichler, 
1996a; 1996b; Nitzan, 1996a). The core firms of the big economy have 
grown 'too large' for the domestic market and their reliance on high 
inflation and burdensome military budgets created a threat of fiscal crisis 
and macroeconomic collapse. In 1986, after the 1983 stock market crash, 
massive wage erosion and record-high real interest rates, annual infla- 
tion was finally brought down from over 500 per cent to less than 20 
per cent. The government also moved to reduce domestic military 
spending and, as if to make a bad situation worse for the large compa- 
nies, in 1987 the world market for exported arms went into a tailspin, 
pushing Israeli exports down to insignificant levels even by domestic 
 standard^.^^ This massive structural economic change coincided with the 
1987 outbreak of the Palestinian Intifada (or uprising) which seriously 
undermined Israeli self-confidence. By the late 1980s, these converging 
developments contributed to a significant drop in corporate profitability 
and a fundamental change of heart on the part of the Israeli elite." The 
alternative path, which the Israelis probably recognized faster than some 
of their Arab neighbours, was regional reconciliation and eventual inte- 
gration into the Middle East economy. This would benefit Israeli 
companies, initially because regional stability and the removal of the 
Arab boycott opens for them vast business opportunities outside 
the region and, subsequently, because Israeli technological and infra- 
structural superiority makes it a likely regional base for foreign 
investment. 
Indeed, the second factor underlying events in the region is that many 
American-based companies are also keen on the business prospects of 
an Arab-Israeli peace. Over the decade 1982-92, investment by US-based 
multinational firms in the industrialized countries yielded an average 
profit margin on sales of only 4.4 per cent - compared with a 7 per cent 
margin earned by their subsidiaries in 'emerging economies'. As a con- 
sequence, US direct foreign investment in these latter markets has 
now surpassed comparable investment in the industrialized countries 
(Nakhjavani and Nitzan, 1994; Nitzan, 1996b). Many western companies 
expect that, in the wake of a regional peace settlement, the Middle East 
will offer similar returns with intra-regional trade growing as fast as 
50 per cent per annum. Such figures may prove to be over-optimistic, 
but they serve to explain current enthusiasm about the prospects of a 
'peace 
A third factor underlying the current peace drive is the conceived 
hazard of Islamic fundamentalism (The Economist, 4 April 1992, 13 March 
1993, 6 August 1994). There is now an entire geographical region, 
stretching from Senegal in West Africa to Kazakhstan to Indonesia, 
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whose twenty-eight countries are inhabited by over half a billion 
Muslims. Many in the West perceive this as representing a potential 
threat to Euro-American culture or 'western civilization' (see, for instance, 
Huntington, 1993). In this context, a successful market-oriented alliance 
between Israel and its Arab neighbours is seen as offering an alternative 
model to Islamic fundamentalism, a model which will hopefully prevent 
a backlash in the eastern Mediterranean. In addition, a pro-American 
axis extending from Turkey through Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan and 
Egypt could create a significant wedge separating the Muslim states of 
North Africa from those which lie east of the Persian Gulf. Such an axis 
is particularly important in view of the growing weakness of the Saudi 
regime, whose curtailed oil revenues make it increasingly vulnerable to 
external challenges and internal strife. 
On the face of it, then, the Middle East seems bound for a period of 
relative stability: most Arab countries see the imperative of a new capi- 
talistic world order and have accepted the existence of Israel; 
multinational companies have a stake in an 'emerging' Middle East; and 
a market-oriented axis in the eastern Mediterranean offers an ideolog- 
ical alternative and a military counterforce to Islamic fundamentalism. 
But the peace process works to undermine the Weapondollar-Petrodollar 
coalition, so that another 'energy conflict' could not be ruled out. 
In 1992, after their brief recovery in 1990-1, the Petro-Core companies 
again fell into the 'danger zone' with their combined rate of return 
lagging behind the improved performance of the Fortune-500 (see 
Figures 2a and 2b). Despite massive rationalization in recent years, the 
crucial determinant of higher profitability remains the price of crude 
petroleum (Business Week, 8 August 1994). In other words, in order to 
'beat the average', the oil companies will first have to see oil prices rising 
again. Under current circumstances, however, the likelihood of such an 
increase occurring on its own is rather small. Although long-term projec- 
tions for the growth of newly industrialized and 'emerging' countries 
point to rising demand for oil, proven oil reserves, particularly in Russia 
and surrounding republics, could expand even faster.44 Moreover, in 
the shorter term, demand growth is expected to be relatively moderate, 
cushioned further by tough competition and large inventories (Business 
Week, 10 January 1994, 8 August 1994). In other words, in the next few 
years, any significant increase in prices - if it is to occur at all - will 
necessitate an atmosphere of crisis.45 The most effective, and for the time 
being the only way of establishing such an atmosphere, is through 
another 'energy conflict' in the Middle East. 
Such a conflict will also serve the hurting members of the Arma-Core. 
Four years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, these firms continue 
to suffer from falling domestic military procurement, which dropped 
by 18 per cent to $123.7 billion in 1993, down from their $150.6 billion 
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peak in 1985.46 For these companies, the pain is partly alleviated by 
growing US military export agreements, which in 1993 amounted to $32 
billion and now account for close to 21 per cent of all military-related 
orders (see Section 7). However, relying on foreign demand in peace- 
time may prove insufficient. Much of the current rise in US military 
exports is the consequence of American producers raising their own 
share in a contracting world market, so in order for those exports to 
continue and grow, the market itself will have to recover from its current 
downward trend. This is already happening in South-East Asia, where 
defence budgets are growing as fast as 5 per cent annually (Klare, 1993; 
The Economist, 23 July 1994), but in the absence of open hostilities in the 
Far East and with sales still falling or stagnant elsewhere, that may not 
be sufficient to reverse the global weapon slump. Of course, there is 
nothing to prevent defence contractors from operating in civilian markets 
and, indeed, many of them now enter into the 'emerging economies' 
where demand for civilian high technology offers new investment 
outlets. However, a conscious departure from the weapons industry 
implies heavy write-offs which the large contractors may not be willing 
to accept that easily. Thus, for these companies, too, a new 'energy 
conflict' in the Middle East will prove highly beneficial. Indeed, such a 
crisis would not only have the effect of raising their exports to the region, 
but it would also demonstrate the need, advocated by many Republicans 
in Congress, for higher military spending at home. 
And so arises, once more, the dilemma between the 'national interest' 
and differential accumulation: while the American public stands to gain 
from Middle East stability, the Weapondollar-Petrodollar coalition 
would benefit from a renewed, albeit limited, conflict. This dilemma is 
reflected in the ambivalent policies of the Clinton administration. With 
the Soviet threat gone, official US goals in the region, as reformulated 
by the National Security Council, are threefold: (1) to promote demo- 
cracy; (2) to advance the Arab-Israeli peace and undermine Islamic 
fundamentalism; and (3) to pursue a policy of 'mutual containment' 
towards both Iraq and Iran (Ha'aretz, 8 June 1993). The third goal, 
however, seems to some extent inconsistent with the previous two. 
With Saudi Arabia vulnerable to internal and external threats, it is not 
clear that continuous antagonism against Iraq is the best way of stabi- 
lizing the Persian Gulf. An alternative policy which draws Iraq into the 
pro-American alliance may be far more effective in isolating Iran and 
undermining the cause of Islamic fundamentali~rn.~~ Israel, which until 
recently emphasized the 'Iranian danger' (partly as a means of bolstering 
its depreciated status as a 'strategic asset' for the US), is reported to have 
conducted secret negotiations with Iraq in 1994. The talks were allegedly 
mediated by European governments and business groups (primarily 
French) whose Middle East markets have been 'monopolized' by the 
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Americans and for which Iraq offers a lucrative alternative (Ha'aretz, 
9 August 1994). However, in November 1994, perhaps after being repri- 
manded by Washington, Israel reiterated its support for the American 
policy of 'mutual containment'. One important reason for the US insis- 
tence, and here we return to the theme of this article, was that 
reconciliation with Iraq would have negative ramifications for the petro- 
leum market. 
Eager to resume its oil sales, Iraq has finally complied with all of the 
UN Security Council's preconditions and in September 1994 requested 
the removal of UN sanctions. However, this would have released onto 
the market an additional 1-2 million oil barrels a day at a time when 
petroleum prices are depressed, when Saudi Arabia is struggling with 
a fiscal crisis and when Petro-Core profitability is stuck below the big 
economy's average. Nevertheless, the danger subsided within a month, 
after, in October, Saddam Hussein reputedly moved 80,000 soldiers 
towards the Kuwaiti border. The Clinton administration reacted imme- 
diately, dispatching to the Persian Gulf a large number of warships and 
aircraft carriers, complete with a task force of 60,000 troops and 600 
aircraft. Threats of a 'pre-emptive' strike by the US Defense Secretary 
Perry were reminiscent of the 1986 skirmishes with Libya - but here, 
too, a full-scale attack failed to materialize as Hussein, much like 
Gaddafy before him, quickly withdrew his forces .The Economist, 15 
October 1994). 
The Iraqi military threat may have been imaginary (indeed, it is not 
even clear that the movement of forces was in any way unusual). But 
the threat of an oil glut was very real, and that has been removed - at 
least for the time being. Indeed, since 1992, when the Petro-Core differ- 
ential profitability again fell into the 'danger zone', American actions in 
the Gulf seem at odds with a commitment to regional stability and cheap, 
freely flowing oil. In January and June 1993, contrary to its own stance 
against the regional missile arms race, the United States launched two 
cruise-missile attacks on Iraqi targets. Then, in mid-1994, the Saudis, 
presumably with tacit US agreement, helped the forces of South Yemen 
in their war against the North, seeking to frustrate the prospects of a 
united, economically powerful neighbour." 
With domestic arms production still declining, the Clinton adminis- 
tration has been increasingly preoccupied with promoting foreign 
high-technology sales - military as well as civilian. 'The President', said 
an executive of a large US company, 'has recognized that, in the post- 
cold-war era, getting global contracts for US business is a matter of 
national security' (Business Week, 23 May 1994). The problem, however, 
is who will pay for this 'national security'. So far, the Gulf states have 
been financing their purchases by getting deeper into debt, but unless 
there is a significant rise in the price of oil, the buying spree will have 
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to subside. The obvious solution is another Middle East 'energy conflict'. 
Provided it is sufficiently severe, the occurrence of such a conflict is 
likely to pull the sluggish profitability of the Petro-Core above that of 
the Fortune-500, replenish the oil revenues of the Gulf states and help 
to pay for imported US weapons. 
Of course, a new 'energy conflict' is by no means inevitable. In the 
absence of a new crisis, a protracted slump in oil prices hurts the 
differential profitability of the oil companies and hence progressively 
undermines their political leverage vis-h-vis other business groups with 
a vested interest in cheaper energy and a stable Middle East. Similarly, 
the longer world military expenditures remain in the doldrums, the 
deeper the retrenchment in the defence sector - via mergers and acqui- 
sitions, as well as through diversification into non-military activity, 
particularly civilian sales in 'emerging markets'. So unless an oil crisis 
erupts within the next few years, the Weapondollar-Petrodollar coalition 
could weaken, perhaps to the point of disintegration. But such disinte- 
gration may prove temporary. Oil remains the world's key source of 
energy and its perceived scarcity could offer ample opportunity for 
triggering future 'energy conflicts'. 
9 SUMMARY COMMENTS 
This article points to the need for international political economy to 
refocus its attention on capital accumulation, particularly on its diferen- 
tial aspect. The differential accumulation of capital - that is, the raising 
of one's profits faster than the average - has grown to become the main 
yardstick for corporate performance and a conventional gauge for 
foreign policy. Our outline of US foreign policy in the Middle East 
showed that, since the late 1960s, successive administrations have been 
increasingly accommodating to the differential interests of two corpor- 
ate groups: the large oil companies and the leading armament contractors 
whose operations coincided in the region. Until the late 1960s, American 
policies were mainly preoccupied with assuring the 'free flow' of oil, 
but then the regional arena began to change. With declining US military 
involvement in Vietnam, US-based armament firms were turning their 
attention to the Middle East - precisely at a time when the global 
oligopoly of the oil majors was facing possible disintegration. 
Increasingly, the two groups of companies contributed to the emergence 
of a new oil regime of 'limited flow', where militarization and 'energy 
conflicts' helped to create an atmosphere of oil crisis. A Weapondollar- 
Petrodollar coalition of such companies grew around a vested interest 
in high oil prices. For the Petro-Core of the oil majors, higher prices 
generally meant higher differential profit margins, while for the Arma- 
Core of leading weapon exporters and engineering firms they implied 
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a larger demand for armament and construction services. Moreover, 
these interests interacted in an ongoing dynamic sequence: with greater 
militarization contributing to tension and conflict; with tension and 
conflict leading to higher prices, differential profits and regional oil 
revenues; and with higher petroleum revenues used to finance a renewed 
cycle of rearmament in preparation for future hostilities. 
US policy in the region has become increasingly consistent with these 
interactive considerations. The popular opinion, influenced to some 
extent by statist ideology, is that from the late 1960s, the United States 
sought to achieve greater regional stability as a means of assuring ample 
oil supply at moderate prices. This view, however, is hardly supported 
by the evidence. Examining the course of US policy in the region, we 
showed that, by trying to strike a delicate (and rather cynical) balance 
between destabilization and high oil prices, this policy was effectively 
leading towards the very opposite end. 
The statistical and institutional evidence suggests that, consciously or 
not, from the early 1970s onwards, successive US administrations were 
operating to counteract adverse drops in the differential profitability of 
the Petro-Core companies (and more generally, to accommodate the 
fortunes of the Weapondollar-Petrodollar coalition). The systematic 
pattern of this relationship is truly remarkable: whenever the rate of return 
of the Petro-Core fell below the 'big economy' average, there followed 
an 'energy conflict' in the Middle East; each of these conflicts ended with 
the Petro-Core's rate of return rising above the comparable big economy 
average; and, finally, no 'energy conflict' occurred without the Petro- 
Core profitability first dropping below the big economy's. 
This pattern is consistent with but does not necessarily mean conspir- 
acy. Our own preference was to go beyond the analysis of rational actors 
and focus on the process of differential capital accumulation as a new 
abiding force conditioning the actions of both politicians and business- 
men. The realities of an ever more integrated world economy induce the 
consolidation of large political-economic coalitions between governments 
and corporate groups which, knowingly or not, find themselves caught 
in the imperative quest for differential gain. In an otherwise fragmented 
political arena, the differential power of these alliances often enables them 
to pursue policies contrary to perceived 'national interests' and even to 
the broad interests of the 'capitalist class'. The experience of the 
Weapondollar-Petrodollar coalition in the Middle East offers an example 
of such pursuit, and could very well show the pattern of things to come. 
In the context of recent theoretical debates on the role of the state, our 
findings could be seen as consistent with some marxist and liberal 
approaches, but not with realist ones. On closer examination, it appears 
that the so-called 'national interest' is not as coherent as some tend to 
believe. In the Middle East, for instance, it is not evident that US policy 
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makers in the 1970s were in favour of low as opposed to high oil prices; . 
it is not clear how in the 1970s and 1980s they sought to promote stability 
via arms sales; their growing military commitment to the Middle East 
in the 1980s stood in sharp contrast to the region's declining significance 
and the lower threat of Soviet intervention; and indeed, these policy 
makers were not even sure what type of Israeli-Arab relations best 
served their interests: some, like Anthony Cordesman, emphasized the 
imperative of solving the Palestinian problem, while others, like 
Alexander Haig, insisted that military shipments were sufficient to 
manipulate Arab regimes (Cordesman, 1984: 981; Haig, 1984: 170; both 
cited in Gold, 1993: 168-71). Given these inherent ambiguities, where 
the 'national interest' could be interpreted in various and often contra- 
dictory ways, empirical testing becomes rather difficult. 
In contrast to these ambiguities in the statist view, the principle of 
differential accumulation is relatively well defined and could stand the 
test of empirical evidence. It enables us to bring the process of capital 
accumulation back into the centre-stage of international political 
economy, and finally it yields predictions which the statist approach has 
so far been unable to provide. 
NOTES 
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1 Even marxist accounts, such as Bina's much-cited study, The Economics of the 
Oil Crisis (1985), or the comprehensive synthesis of Bromley, US Hegemony 
and World Oil (1991), fail to provide any systematic evidence about the 
accumulation of capital. 
2 Preliminary research on the topic appeared in an earlier series of four discus- 
sion papers: Bichler, Nitzan and Rowley (1989); Nitzan, Rowley and Bichler 
(1989); Rowley, Bichler and Nitzan (1989); and Bichler, Rowley and Nitzan 
(1989). 
3 The Arma-Core includes, in alphabetical order, Boeing, General Dynamics, 
General Electric, Grumman, Honeywell, Litton Industries, Lockheed, 
McDonnell Douglas, Martin Marietta, Northrop, Raytheon, Rockwell Inter- 
national, Texas Instrument, Textron, United Technologies and Westinghouse. 
The Petro-Core consists of British Petroleum, Chevron, Exxon, Mobil, Royal 
Dutch/Shell and Texaco. 
4 The methodological and empirical bases for these charts are discussed at 
length in Nitzan and Bichler (1995). 
5 Prediction regarding this outcome must be interpreted with care because of 
recent accounting changes affecting reported corporate profitability. Since 
1991, many large US-based firms have had to adjust their current profits to 
reflect the true cost of future retirement health benefits (as required by 
Statement 106 of the Financial Accounting Standard Board, or SFAS 106). 
The consequence, particularly in 1992 and 1993, was a very significant drop 
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in reported profit margins. For the Fortune-500, the net rate of return on 
equity dropped to 0.14 per cent in 1992 (compared to 10.04 per cent without 
SFAS 106) and then recovered to 8.63 per cent (still below the 11.26 per cent 
recorded without the SFAS 106 adjustment). In our charts, we plotted 
Fortune-500 profitability for 1992 and 1993 without the special SFAS 106 
charges. Unfortunately, there are no comparable data for the Petro-Core firms 
which are reported here with the SFAS 106 adjustment whenever applicable. 
This may present a problem for 1992, when SFAS 106 charges for some US 
members of the Petro-Core (Chevron, Mobil and Texaco) were in excess of 
10 per cent of their overall net income. By 1993, however, the large oil com- 
panies' adjustments were either completed or less than 10 per cent of their 
net profits. 
6 The idea of turning Israel into a western logistical base was promoted relent- 
lessly by Ben Gurion throughout the 1950s. His suggestion was to build 
American military bases in the Israeli Negev desert and to have the Israeli 
army participate in defending the region against the Soviet Union. On one 
occasion, Ben Gurion even proposed that the US finance a 250,000-strong 
Israeli military force dedicated specifically to such tasks (Gazit, 1983a: 16; 
Bar Zohar, 1975: 1320). 
7 Some of these connections involved the Texas oil associations of Vice- 
President Johnson, the south-western and international oil affiliations of 
Secretary of the Navy Connally, the Rockefeller links of Secretary of State 
Dillon, and the long-term business partnership between CIA director 
McCone and the Bechtel family (Engler, 1977: 5743; McCal-tney, 1989). 
8 According to former Israeli ambassador to the United States, Abba Eban 
(1977: 185), many in the State Department were convinced of Israel's mili- 
tary ability to win a 'crushing victory' already in the 1950s. 
9 After the war, Israeli Defence Force (IDF) generals such as Weitzman, Peled 
and Rabin admitted quite openly that Nasser had presented no real danger, 
a claim which was later reiterated by Prime Minister Beguin. Ten days before 
the war, a secret CIA report delivered to President Johnson accurately 
predicted an Israeli victory within six days. Some US officials who hoped 
to avert a war communicated these assessments directly to Jordan and Egypt 
and, indeed, until the last moment, Nasser still hoped for a diplomatic solu- 
tion (Cockburn and Cockburn, 1991: 14&54). 
10 While official crude prices had not changed, fuel prices for western 
consumers had risen, thus boosting the profits of the oil companies while 
undermining them elsewhere in the economy. 
11 Representatives of Rockefeller's Chase Manhattan were also involved in the 
network of activists around Nixon's career, and some of them accepted key 
posts in his administration. Volker, for example, was made Under Secretary 
of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs, Letty became Assistant Secretary of 
the Treasury, and Fiero became Director of the Office of Foreign Direct 
Investment in the Commerce Department (Barnet and Miiller, 1974: 251; 
Turner, 1983: 105). 
12 During the period between 1962 and 1966, Israel imported an average of 
$107 million worth of weapons per annum. After the 1967 War - in 1967-9 
- this average almost tripled to $290 millions, now mostly coming from the 
United States. And with the new Nixon Doctrine, the annual levels for the 
197&2 period rose further, to an average of $550 million (data from Israel 
Central Bureau of Statistics, courtesy of R. Graff). 
13 Allegations that the US government was promoting higher prices as a 
ARTICLES 
primary means of funding US arms deliveries to the Shah were put forward 
on the CBS programme Sixty Minutes (3 May 1980). Kissinger declined to 
reply to the anegations (Chan, 1980: 244). Given his close relationship with 
the embattled Chase Manhattan, Kissinger many have also considered the 
effect of petrodollar deposits on the Rockefeller bank's balance sheet 
(Sampson, 1981a). 
14 For example, Secretary of State Rogers (later a retainer for the Shah and a 
Sohio director) termed US military sales as having a 'stabilizing influence' 
as opposed to the 'invitation for trouble' posed by similar Soviet shipments 
(Engler, 1977: 242). A somewhat more sophisticated picture was painted by 
Kissinger (1981: 182) who explained that the 'balance of power is a kind of 
policeman, whose responsibility is to prevent peaceful countries from feeling 
impotent and aggressors from becoming reckless'. 
15 Israel was compensated for its withdrawal from the Sinai peninsula with 
two new air fields in the Negev desert worth $2.2 billion, and a 'reorgani- 
zation' package of fifteen F-15 and seventy-five F-16 aircraft valued at 
$1.9 billion. The Egyptians were allowed to purchase fifty F-5 fighter aircraft 
worth $400 million (with an option to buy more advanced ones later) and 
the Saudis bought another sixty F-15s worth $2.5 billion (Ha'aretz, 3 April 
1983). Cyrus Vance, who participated in the negotiations as Carter's Secretary 
of State, was later nominated a director of General Dynamics, one of the 
main beneficiaries of the agreement. 
16 The process which led to the seizure of Iranian assets is explained in 
Sampson (1981a, 1981b: ch. 17). During the period from 1976 to 1978, Iran 
borrowed $3.8 billion to finance arms purchases. On the eve of the Iranian 
Revolution, an outstanding debt of $500 million was owed to a consortium 
headed by Chase Manhattan, but Iranian deposits of $433 million were also 
held by the bank. However, Chase Manhattan had no legal authority to hold 
onto the fund and the money was eventually seized only after the hostage 
crisis induced the US government to freeze Iranian assets. Rockefeller was 
not passive in the onset of this crisis. Sampson reveals how Kissinger (a 
special adviser to Chase Manhattan at the time) and McCloy (a former 
chairman of the bank) courted Carter (himself closely associated with the 
Rockefellers through the Trilateral Commission) until the President granted 
asylum to the Shah despite the fragile political atmosphere. (Kissinger later 
told Sampson that there was nothing subversive in these activities, arguing 
that it was inconceivable that 'a few private citizens' could affect govern- 
ment policy.) In the turmoil that followed, the government in Tehran 
threatened to withdraw its deposits from US banks and President Carter 
froze them, insisting that this was necessary in order to prevent destabi- 
lization of the banking system. That reasoning, however, was unfounded: 
first, only about $8 billion of Iranian assets were on deposit in US banks 
which was markedly insufficient to destabilize the American banking system 
and, second, most of these deposits were held not in North America but in 
London. Yet, although the situation presented no meaningful threat to the 
American economy as a whole, some individual banks - notably Chase 
Manhattan and Citibank of the Rockefeller group - were vulnerable. 
17 Brzezinski, according to his deputy for Iranian affairs Gary Sick, made no 
secret of his desire to see Iran 'punished from all sides', and said that he 
would not object to an Iraqi action against it (reported in Cockburn and 
Cockbum, 1991: 392). 
18 The allegations about a deal between Iran and the Reagan campaign head- 
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quarters were first made by Gary Sick and others (New York Times, 15 April 
1991; Sick, 1991). 
19 Syria, Lebanon and Israel remained in the European command EUCOM, but 
Egypt, now part of CENTCOM, was drawn closer to the US orbit through 
joint military exercises in 1982 with forces from the United States, Sudan, 
Somalia and Oman. The significance of Egypt increased further after a 1985 
coup toppled Numeiri in Sudan. 
20 Haig had previously served as Nixon's Deputy Assistant for National 
Security Affairs and as the White House Chief of Staff, but his leverage was 
much stronger now. Shiff and Yaari (1984) allege that he gave Israel's 
Security Minister Sharon the 'green light' to invade Lebanon in 1982. United 
Technology, to which Haig later returned as a special consultant, exports 
helicopters and aircraft engines to the Middle East. Haig was able to 
persuade the Israeli government to install United Technology's engines in 
its proposed Lavi aircraft - although the IDF preferred the alternative engines 
made by General Electric. 
21 The Bechtel family owns about two-fifths of the company's shares while 
ownership of the remainder is spread among senior managers. The com- 
pany could not be included in our statistical analysis of corporate profits 
because, until recently, its private ownership precluded the collection of 
appropriate data. 
22 Perhaps the largest bribe was the $200 million paid to Saudi officials in 
return for the $3.4 billion contract to build the new airport in Riyadh. 
The earliest covert operation involved the Syrian coup of 1949, after the 
Syrian government raised obstacles to the construction by Bechtel of a 
Saudi-Syrian pipeline. 
23 Because they are the largest profit makers, oil companies had the most to 
benefit from tax savings, and the gains were indeed substantial. For example, 
during the five years between 1976 and 1980, the petroleum-refining industry 
earned a total profit of $99.2 billion of which it paid $28.3 billion, or 28.5 
per cent, in federal, state and local taxes. In the subsequent period between 
1981 and 1986, after Reagan came to power, the industry's aggregate profit 
rose to $121.2 billion, but its taxes fell to $23.9 billion, which now repre- 
sented an effective tax rate of only 19.8 per cent (computed from Citibase, 
1990). According to a Business Week study (10 June 1985), corporations in the 
oil and gas industry, which in 1984 earned $40 billion in pre-tax income, 
paid only $3.3 billion - or 8.4 per cent -in federal taxes. 
24 According to the Iran-Contra Report issued by Special Prosecutor Walsh 
seven years after he began his inquiry, the operation was conceived and 
approved at the highest level of the US -overnment, involving President 
Reagan, Vice-president Bush, Secretary of $ tate Shultz, Secretary of Defense 
Weinberger and many other lesser offici.als (New York Times, 19 January 1994). 
25 According to retired IDF General ~ v r a h a m  Tamir, Defense Secretary Haig 
explained to his Israeli counterpart Sharon that the US goal was to 'prevent 
either side from winning' (Cockburn and Cockburn, 1991: 328, 339). Waas 
and Unger (1992: 65) describe, in rather colourful language how the admin- 
istration "'tilted" back and forth between support for Iran and support for 
Iraq, sometimes helping both countries simultaneously, sometimes covertly 
arming one side as a corrective to unanticipated consequences of having 
helped the other'. 
26 The London Obsetver, 9 September 1985, cited in Cockburn and Cockburn 
(1991: 393). Gary Sick claims that Israeli annual shipments were worth 
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between $500 million and $1 billion (Washington Post, 5 December 1986, cited 
in Ferrari et al., 1987: 3%). 
'We're all down now to nibbling crumbs', professed a frustrated US defence 
company executive during a 1985 air show in Paris: 'The damn oil boom 
has gone and there is not much money around any more' (cited in Ferrari 
et al., 1987: 4-5). 
For example, according to the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, real indus- 
trial output per unit of energy in the United States rose by more than 50 
per cent over the 1973-85 period (Fortune, 3 December 1990). Overall, during 
that period the United States became 25 per cent more energy efficient and 
32 per cent more oil efficient, whereas for Japan, the corresponding numbers 
were 31 per cent and 51 per cent, respectively (Yergin, 1991: 718). 
Tracing the financing of the Iraq-Iran War is a complicated task since both 
countries received substantial financial and material assistance from other 
sources. The government of Khomeini was supported by both Syria and 
Libya, while Iraq allegedly received $30-60 billion in cash and replacement 
oil from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states (Business Week, 4 June 1985; 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1987: 303). 
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (1987: 
xxvi), by 1987 the belligerent sides had together spent $400 billion on 
combating each other. 
For the full list of known suppliers, see Stockholm International Peace Re- 
search Institute (1987: Table 7.8, 204-5). Some estimates suggest that Iraq 
imported about $40 billion worth of arms during the period from 1980 to 
1986, while Iran's foreign purchases amounted to $30 billion. The overall 
stake of covert US shipments in these totals must have been limited. The 
prime suppliers for the war were based in France, the United Kingdom, 
West Germany, Italy, South Africa, the Soviet Union, China, North and South 
Korea, Vietnam, Israel, Taiwan and Brazil (Business Week, 29 December 1986). 
According to Jane's DqCence Weekly, Iraq even supplied Iran, reselling through 
private dealers heavy weapons previously captured in the fighting (reported 
in Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1987: 307). For detailed 
accounts of the arming of Iraq during and after the Iran-Iraq War, see 
Darwish and Alexander (1991: chs 4-6) and Timmerman (1991). 
According to Waas and Unger (1992), the Bush visit in 1986 had another, 
not so peaceful side: they allege that the Vice-President was instructed by 
CIA Director Casey to encourage Iraqi aerial bombing attacks on Iran - 
attacks which would create a need for anti-aircraft defence systems and hope- 
fully make Iran receptive to the administration's initiative of trading hostages 
for Hawk missiles. 
In 1988, the administration suggested increasing US arms exports by $3.3 
billion to a level exceeding $15 billion - with proposed shipments worth 
$3.6 billion to Israel, $2.7 billion to Egypt, $950 million to Saudi Arabia and 
$1.3 million to other Middle Eastern countries (New York Times, 2 May 1988). 
This proposal did not prevent Secretary of State Shultz from declaring in 
front of the UN General Assembly a few weeks later that 'developing coun- 
tries must help reduce the international tension and ease the arms race' (Nezo 
York Times, 14 June 1988). 
In 1985, the Congress refused to approve the sale to Saudi Arabia of forty 
advanced McDonnell Douglas F-15 aircraft and, in 1986, blocked the sale of 
800 General Dynamics Stinger missiles. In 1988, the US Senate voted to deny 
a Kuwaiti request for General Motors Maverick missiles and also forbade 
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the sale of Stinger missiles to Oman (Nm York Times, 13 May 1988; Time, 25 
July 1988). 
Some of these included Brady, who previously ran Dillon, Read & Company 
when it was controlled by Bechtel and was now nominated Treasury 
Secretary, and Mosbacher, an oil businessman who now became Secretary 
of Commerce (during the 1990s, Mosbacher, together with Bush's Secretary 
of State Baker, joined the energy infrastructure giant Enron as special consul- 
tants). Bush also wanted Tower to become Secretary of Defense, but the 
former senator who acted as a retainer for five defence contractors failed the 
confirmation hearings and the post eventually went to Cheney - a strong 
supporter of 'Star Wars' and the Nicaraguan Contra rebels. 
Many oil executives actually felt relieved by the more moderate prices, which 
were still high enough to assure adequate profitability without drawing 
allegations of 'conspiracy'. To prevent such criticisms, some oil companies 
decided during the last quarter of 1990 to write off part of their profits as 
reserves for meeting the cost of future environmental regulations (Business 
Week, 11 February 1991). 
These figures are for total US exports to Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, 
Jordan, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates and Yemen 
(computed from US Department oi Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 
Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1993: Table 1351, 813-16). 
This vision was expressed during the same postwar speech in which the 
President called for a wider Middle East peace (New York Times, 7 March 
1991). To help erase some of the traces of such 'micro-management' in which 
both Reagan and Bush were explicitly implicated, the latter granted pardons 
in 1992 to six key figures in the Iran-Contra Affair, including Weinberger 
whose trial was just about to begin. 
US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment (1991: 21) and Nezu York 
Times, 18 March 1991. Government support was not limited to defence 
contracts, of course. For example, despite their common praise for free 
competition, both President Bush and his Secretary of State Mosbacher did 
not hesitate to intervene personally on behalf of AT&T when Saudi Arabia 
appeared to prefer European contractors for its $8.1 billion plan to expand 
the kingdom's telephone network (Business Week, 18 February 1991). The 
Clinton administration kept up the pressure and AT&T eventually won the 
contract. 
According to the US Congressional Research Service, this occurred partly 
due to the decline in Soviet exports which began during the late 1980s (New 
York Times, 11 August 1991). 
Military contracts for Israeli companies fell from 5.1 per cent of GDP in 1987, 
to 3.9 per cent by 1993 (Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics, 1993). According 
to data published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 
world exports of major weapon systems (in constant 1990 prices) dropped 
from $46 billion in 1987, to $18.4 billion by 1992. The Israeli stake in that 
trade fell to $66 million in 1992, down from $408 million in 1987 (see Nitzan, 
1994). 
Net profits of the six largest Israeli conglomerates fell from 3 per cent of 
GDP in 1984, to less than 1 per cent by the early 1990s (see Nitzan and 
Bichler, 1996a). 
Since 1994, multinational companies from the US, Europe and Japan, which 
have never before set up shop in Israel, have been actively courting the 
government and local partners for a piece of the 'peace action'. Israel is now 
. 
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seen as a springboard to the 'emerging' Middle East - so much so that the 
large multinational corporations find themselves competing with firms from 
newly industrialized countries, such as Korea and Taiwan, for which the 
Near East now offers an even cheaper production base and untapped markets. 
44 Future energy trends were analysed in a recent World Energy Council 
Conference in Cape Town (reported on Bloomberg, 14 October 1994). 
45 The effect on oil prices of a crisis atmosphere is analysed in Nitzan and 
Bichler (1995). 
46 Expressed in constant 1987 prices, the decline was much more severe, with 
overall prime contract awards dropping by 37.6 per cent - from $159.5 billion 
in 1985, to $99.6 billion in 1993 (military contract data are from the US 
Department of Defense, 100 Companies Receiving the Largest Dollar Volume of 
Prime Contract Awards, 1985, 1993; constant-price data are derived by 
deflating original figures by the US GDP deflator from US Congress, 
Economic Report of the President, 1994). 
47 Indeed, it was Saddam Hussein himself who suggested only a few days after 
he invaded Kuwait that his country could still be the region's guardian of 
US interests (Darwish and Alexander, 1991: 291-2). 
48 Based on CIA sources, the, Sunday Times reported that the Saudis even hired 
a Russian squadron of twelve Mig 29 aircraft, complete with pilots, to help 
the South Yemeni forces slow down the advance of the North (Ha'aretz, 8 
August 1994). 
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